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Abstract
Accounting Fraud is one of the most harmful financial crimes as it often results in
massive corporate collapses, commonly silenced by powerful high-status executives
and managers. Accounting fraud represents a significant threat to the financial
system stability due to the resulting diminishing of the market confidence and trust
of regulatory authorities. Its catastrophic consequences expose how vulnerable and
unprotected the community is in regards to this matter, since most damage is inflicted
to investors, employees, customers and government.
Accounting fraud is defined as the calculated misrepresentation of the financial
statement information disclosed by a company in order to mislead stakeholders
regarding the firm?s true financial position. Different fraudulent tricks can be used
to commit accounting fraud, either direct manipulation of financial items or creative
methods of accounting, hence the need for non-static regulatory interventions that
take into account different fraudulent patterns. Accordingly, this study aims to
identify signs of accounting fraud occurrence to be used to, first, identify companies
that are more likely to be manipulating financial statement reports, and second,
assist the task of examination within the riskier firms by evaluating relevant financial
red-flags, as to efficiently recognise irregular accounting malpractices. To achieve this,
a thorough forensic data analytic approach is proposed that includes all pertinent
steps of a data-driven methodology.
First, data collection and preparation is required to present pertinent information
related to fraud offences and financial statements. The compiled sample of known
fraudulent companies is identified considering all Accounting Series Releases and
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases issued by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission between 1990 and 2012, procedure that resulted in 1,594
fraud-year observations. Then, an in-depth financial ratio analysis is performed
in order to evaluate publicly available financial statement data and to preserve
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only meaningful predictors of accounting fraud. In particular, two commonly used
statistical approaches, including non-parametric hypothesis testing and correlation
analysis, are proposed to assess significant differences between corrupted and
genuine reports as well as to identify associations between the considered ratios.
The selection of a smaller subset of explanatory variables is later reinforced by the
implementation of a complete subset logistic regression methodology.
Finally, statistical modelling of fraudulent and non-fraudulent instances is performed
by implementing several machine learning methods. Classical classifiers are
considered first as benchmark frameworks, including logistic regression and
discriminant analysis. More complex techniques are implemented next based on
decision trees bagging and boosting, including bagged trees, AdaBoost and random
forests.
In general, it can be said that a clear enhancement in the understanding of the fraud
phenomenon is achieved by the implementation of financial ratio analysis, mainly
due to the interesting exposure of distinctive characteristics of falsified reporting
and the selection of meaningful ratios as predictors of accounting fraud, later
validated using a combination of logistic regression models. Interestingly, using only
significant explanatory variables leads to similar results obtained when no selection is
performed. Furthermore, better performance is accomplished in some cases, which
strongly evidences the convenience of employing less but significant information
when detecting accounting fraud offences.
Moreover, out-of-sample results suggest there is a great potential in detecting falsified
accounting records through statistical modelling and analysis of publicly available
accounting information. It has been shown good performance of classic models used
as benchmark and better performance of more advanced methods, which supports
the usefulness of machine learning models as they appropriately meet the criteria
of accuracy, interpretability and cost-efficiency required for a successful detection
methodology.
This study contributes in the improvement of accounting fraud detection in
several ways, including the collection of a comprehensive sample of fraud and
non-fraud firms concerning all financial industries, an extensive analysis of financial
information and significant differences between genuine and fraudulent reporting,
selection of relevant predictors of accounting fraud, contingent analytical modelling
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for better differentiate between non-fraud and fraud cases, and identification of
industry-specific indicators of falsified records.
The proposed methodology can be easily used by public auditors and regulatory
agencies in order to assess the likelihood of accounting fraud and to be adopted in
combination with the experience and instinct of experts to lead to better examination
of accounting reports. In addition, the proposed methodological framework could be
of assistance to many other interested parties, such as investors, creditors, financial
and economic analysts, the stock exchange, law firms and to the banking system,
amongst others.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the last few decades, accounting fraud has been drawing a great deal of attention
amongst researchers and practitioners, as it is becoming increasingly frequent and
complex, and therefore, more difficult to prevent and control it effectively. It is
considered to be one of the most harmful corporate crimes (Mokhiber and Weissman,
2005), since it is believed to be connected to other major white-collar crimes, such as
securities offences, organised crime and money laundering.
In the framework of this thesis, accounting fraud is defined as the calculated
misrepresentation of the financial statement information that is publicly disclosed
by companies. The intention is to mislead stakeholders regarding the firm’s true
financial position, by overstating its expectations on assets, or understating exposure
to liabilities; hence the artificial inflation of earnings, as well as its return on equity.
Accounting fraud may take the form of either direct manipulation of financial items
or via creative methods of accounting (Shilit and Perler, 2010).
The catastrophic consequences of accounting fraud evidence how vulnerable and
unprotected the community is in regard to this matter, since most damage is inflicted
to investors, employees, customers and regulatory authorities. Accounting fraud
often results in massive corporate collapses and deterioration of market confidence
(Ngai et al., 2011), which is rapidly silenced by powerful high-status executives and
managers. Several accounting scandals reflect this reality, the Enron infamous case
being one of the most controversial. Exposed in October 2001, this scam concluded
with the bankruptcy of the company, followed by 4,500 employees who lost their jobs
1
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and pension funds, and an estimated loss of 74 billion dollars assumed by investors
and stakeholders.
Perpetrators of accounting fraud can be motivated by personal benefit (e.g.:
maximisation of compensation packages), or by explicit or implied contractual
obligations such as debt covenants, and the need to meet market projections and
expected economic growth. The most harm is inflicted to the long-run reputation
of the organisation itself, the value destruction of investors and the diminishing
of the public’s trust in the capital market. Other victims often include employees,
suppliers, partners, customers, regulatory institutions, enforcement agencies, taxation
authorities, the stock exchange, creditors and financial analysts (Pai, Hsu, and Wang,
2011).
Standard auditing procedures are often insufficient to identify fraudulent accounting
reports since most managers recognise the limitations of audits, hence the need for
additional comprehensive analytical methods to detect accounting fraud accurately
and in an early stage (Kaminski, Wetzel, and Guan, 2004). In addition, given their
hidden dynamic characteristics, ‘book cooking’ accounting practices are particularly
hard to detect, thus the importance of more sophisticated tools to be used to assist the
early identification of risk signs and to further expose complex fraudulent schemes.
Although several data-informed quantitative models have been developed to
automate and reduce the manual auditing processes related to false reporting
identification (Bose, Piramuthu, and Shaw, 2011), these are not sufficient to uncover
complex fraudulent structures and to identify warning signs of accounting fraud.
Accordingly, the present study aims to improve the detection of accounting fraud
offences through a detailed analysis of discovered fraudulent cases and an exhaustive
evaluation of financial features that best determine the occurrence of falsified
accounting reporting.
2
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1.2 Problem Statement
The research question seeking to be answered by this thesis is defined as follows:
What financial red-flags should be examined in order to detect accounting fraud?
To properly address the previous question, it is required to investigate the following
key components:
1. Relevant financial information for accounting fraud detection.
2. Machine learning methods to estimate the likelihood of fraud occurrence.
3. Risk indicators for effective accounting fraud detection.
Accordingly, the main objective of this research project is to improve the detection rate
of accounting fraud offences through the implementation of several machine learning
methods and assessment of key financial risk indicators, in order to potentially assist
the design of an innovative, flexible and responsive regulatory tool.
1.3 Research Approach
In order to achieve the proposed objective and to further answer the research question,
a detailed methodology has been implemented considering all relevant steps of a
forensic data analysis approach: (i) data collection, preparation and validation; (ii)
examination of potential explanatory variables and further selection of the most
relevant ones; (iii) modelling of the fraudulent phenomenon; (iv) critical assessment
of statistical models; (v) interpretation of results; and (vi) conclusions and suggestions
related to corporate regulation and examination of financial reports.
1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are the following:
1. Examination of the state of the art associated with accounting fraud detection:
Critical review of previous studies related to statistical methods and their
capability of detecting fraudulent financial reports. Analysis of the proposed
methodologies, sample selection process, chosen sample size, explanatory
3
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variables considered, data mining models employed and achieved predictive
accuracy.
2. Collection of a relative large database of accounting fraud offences:
Manual compilation of accounting fraud cases of public U.S. companies and
their corresponding financial statement data. This includes the information of
all litigation releases related to accounting fraud offences published by the U.S.
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) between 1990 and 2012. This task
is considered by the author as one of the most relevant, since a great effort was
made to gather substantial information to be used as an adequate representation
of the population of accounting fraud offences.
3. Evaluation of financial information related to fraudulent reporting:
In depth analysis of financial reporting items in order to deduce the relationship
between unethical behaviour and business performance. Moreover, an
exhaustive assessment of relevant financial ratios has been performed to better
understand illicit accounting practices across all industries, as well as within
specific economic domains.
4. Modelling of the accounting fraud phenomenon:
Implementation and assessment of several analytical models to first assist the
selection of significant explanatory variables, and second to achieve satisfactory
detection rates. What is more, the outcome of the proposed modelling exercise is
considered of value, as interesting fraudulent behaviours are exposed that help
with the identification of premature warning signs of accounting fraud.
5. Recommendation of financial indicators for adaptive corporate regulation:
Identification of industry-specific financial ’red flags’ to be used for effective
examination of public documents. Relevant financial indicators are suggested
to be part of the regulatory agenda, in order to better support the control
and prevention of accounting fraud offences, and to further strengthen the
regulatory system in performing this task.
4
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1.5 Thesis Outline
An overview of the chapters constituting this thesis is presented below:
Chapter 2: The Accounting Fraud Phenomenon
The main objective of this chapter is to attain a better understanding of the
phenomenon of accounting fraud. In light of this, a preliminary theoretical framework
is elaborated with regard to white-collar crime, corporate crime and accounting fraud.
A brief explanation of some of the worst financial reporting scandals is given to
evidence the tragic consequences of accounting fraud, followed by a description
of potential victims. Then, after a careful review of the literature, it is argued the
use of forensic accounting techniques to appropriately approach the phenomenon of
accounting fraud. Finally, the proposed methodology is introduced and justified in
the basis of what is missing or could be improved, and what can be done to enhance
the detection of accounting fraud from an empirical point of view.
Chapter 3: Forensic Data Analysis
In this chapter, the focus is primarily the data. A complete detail of how the data was
collected is presented in this section along with the description of the following steps
of data cleaning, data transformation, data merging and data validation.
Chapter 4: Financial Ratio Analysis
The final goal of Chapter 4 is variable selection, that is, finding the most significant
explanatory variables for detecting accounting fraud offences. It essentially supports
the use of financial ratios as predictors of falsified reporting by means of analysing
statistically significant differences between ratios obtained from fraudulent reports
and genuine reports. This ratio analysis is first performed irrespectively of the
economic sector, and then taking into consideration the industry division where
companies belong to.
Chapter 5: Complete Subset Logistic Regression
An innovative statistical approach is presented and further expanded to support the
number of explanatory variables selected in the previous chapter.
Chapter 6: Accounting Fraud Modelling
In this chapter, the objective is to obtain satisfactory detection rates of accounting
fraud offences. In order to achieve this, several machine learning methods are
described and further implemented for determining the likelihood of accounting
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fraud occurrence. Finally, an interesting interpretation of numerical results is
performed again for all industries, and then by industry division.
Chapter 7: Financial Indicators of Accounting Fraud
Results from the previous chapter are expanded to identify industry-specific
indicators of accounting fraud. Chapter 7 promotes the use of these financial red flags
when oversight tasks are performed.
Chapter 8: Conclusions, Limitations and Future Work
In this final chapter, all steps of the proposed methodology are summarised as
well as the main contributions of the study. The importance of understanding the
phenomenon of accounting fraud, statistical modelling and further identification
of relevant red-flags, is once again briefly explained and emphasised. Limitations
of the suggested methodology are identified and explained, and future work is
recommended based on the exhaustive data analysis performed throughout the thesis.
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The Accounting Fraud
Phenomenon
In order to efficiently detect accounting fraud offences, a comprehensive
understanding of the phenomenon is required. For this reason, a theoretical
framework has to be elaborated first with regard to white-collar crime and corporate
crime. Once the general context has been established, a complete overview of the
phenomenon of accounting fraud is discussed to further evidence its catastrophic
consequences.
2.1 Overview of White-Collar Crime
Almost 70 years ago, Edwin H. Sutherland introduced the term white-collar crime as ’a
crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of
his occupation’ (Sutherland, 1949). Although Sutherland’s definition has generated a
great deal of criticism and controversy (Simpson and Weisburd, 2009), it exhibits the
important issue of inappropriately recognise, prevent and control crimes perpetrated
by persons in position of power (Benson and Simpson, 2014). The problem of
white-collar crime is particularly serious and complex, since it occurs in almost every
country and industry.
How white-collar offences are committed is specially intriguing, since it typically
involves a professional using his or her expert knowledge to take advantage of people
who trust that the professional will act on behalf of their best interests. In light
of this, white-collar crime is an offence fully determined by the abuse of power of
7
Chapter 2. The Accounting Fraud Phenomenon
professionals who most likely perceive their deceptive behaviour as normal business
practices, which is usually referred to as moral insensitivity.
As Benson and Simpson (2014) explain, white-collar crimes are always associated
with criminal opportunities, which basically consist of a suitable target and lack
of guardianship. Consequently, holding particular occupational positions will
greatly facilitate access to white-collar crime opportunities. There are many types
of white-collar crime, including fraud, antitrust violations, bribery, embezzlement,
money laundering, environmental crimes and workplace crimes, amongst others. As
such, different criminal opportunities and behaviours can be identified and further
analysed in order to properly define deterrence strategies.
Many of these offences are committed by corporations or, in other words, by
individuals acting on behalf of a corporation. It is believed that organisational
crimes are significantly more expensive compared to individual offences basically
due to the economic and political power of people in charge (Benson and Simpson,
2014). Fraudulent corporations often use their economic advantages and resources
to hide illicit activities behind legitimate business, and further manipulate the legal
environment within which they operate. A more detailed analysis of corporate crime
is given in the following section.
2.2 Overview of Corporate Crime
As mentioned earlier, corporate crimes are basically white-collar crime offences
committed by corporations or people acting on behalf of them. It includes all
corporate activities that are proscribed and punishable by law (Braithwaite, 1984).
In this case, what is pursued are organisational benefits rather than individual gains
(Simpson, 2002). Many corporate crime offences are committed within large and
complex organisations. As such, many people may be involved, making it very
difficult to determine who is responsible for the harm.
Corporate crimes are considered to be much more common and costly than people
may think (Benson and Simpson, 2014). Illegal activities committed by corporation
may result in catastrophic consequences in terms of human lives, economically and
environmentally. Some scholars consider that corporate crime is perhaps one of the
most dangerous crimes that occurs in our society (Simpson, 2002).
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As Mokhiber (2007) clearly explains, corporate crime inflicts far more social and
economic damage than all street crime combined. He claims that corporate crime is
often violent crime, considering the astonish number of workers who die every year
on their jobs or from occupational diseases, or the thousands of people ’who fall victim
of the silent violence of pollution, contaminated food, hazardous consumer products
and hospital malpractices’.
Countless social problems, such as recolonisation of developing countries, oppression
of native and indigenous communities, food contamination, medical negligence
and unsafe working conditions, are consequence of concentrated corporate power
(Mokhiber and Weissman, 2005). What is more, many of the sanctions imposed
on corporations have limited impact on their finance and business practices, hence
the need for alternative deterrence approaches and effective control strategies of
corporate crime.
In light of this, a deep analysis of a specific type of corporate crime will be
proposed and implemented in the following chapters. In particular, all efforts will be
focused on the understanding, modelling and analysis of accounting fraud offences.
Consequently, an overview of the accounting fraud phenomenon is given next, along
with a review of the most important accounting scandals of modern times as evidence
of the social and economic impact of dishonest business reporting.
2.3 Overview of Accounting Fraud
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) is one of the largest anti-fraud
organisations responsible for providing anti-fraud training and education worldwide.
In the ACFE‘s 2015 Fraud Examiners Manual, accounting fraud is defined as “the
deliberate misrepresentation of the financial condition of an enterprise accomplished
through the intentional misstatement or omission of amounts or disclosures in the
financial statements to deceive financial statement users". Several synonyms of
accounting fraud exist in the literature, including the so-called financial statement
fraud, corporate fraud and management fraud.
According to Van Vlasselaer et al. (2015), there are five key characteristics that clearly
distinguish between a genuine mistake and a fraudulent activity. They state that
fraud is an "uncommon, well-considered, imperceptibly concealed, time-evolving and
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often carefully organised crime" that needs to be meticulously understood in order to
achieve its early detection.
Furthermore, they say that by all means, fraud offences are not crimes that happen
fortuitously but carefully planned instead. Fraudsters are not impulsive individuals;
they are constantly adapting and perfecting their methods in order to maintain illicit
moves undetected. The use of complex and organised schemes is very common when
committing fraud, so the analysis should never be performed considering isolated
events but rather the phenomenon as a whole.
It is also said that fraud is a corrupt behaviour, since it involves the misuse
of entrusted power for personal gain (Baesens, Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015).
Accounting fraud is not directly associated with corruption by a politician or
public servant, but by high-status senior executives using their privileged position
for private benefits, regardless of whether they undermine the credibility of the
organisation they promised to lead and manage, nor the dire consequences for their
workers and customers.
2.4 Infamous Accounting Scandals
The dramatic increase of corporate accounting scandals in the last two decades
accounts for the severity of this pandemic phenomenon, which often results in
corporate bankruptcy, market collapse, economic crisis and more.
A brief explanation of some of the worst financial reporting scandals reported at large
corporations is given next in order to illustrate the underestimated consequences of
this unethical behaviour.
Enron, 2001
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1.1, Enron Corporation, a giant energy company
funded in 1985, engaged in a massive fraudulent scheme that culminated abruptly
towards the end of the year 2001 with its impressive collapse and further bankruptcy.
The main players of the manoeuvre, Chairman Jen Kay and CEO Jeffrey Skilling,
kept billions of dollars in debt off the records, by using thousands of unconsolidated
partnerships and very complicated financial reporting.
Eventually, figures did not match and the inevitable reduction in net income led to an
approximate billion dollar-reduction in the equity of stockholders. Investors reacted
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immediately and soon Enron’s stock price collapsed, precipitating the company
towards an imminent bankruptcy. Consequently, Enron’s shareholders lost nearly $74
billion and 4,500 employees lost their jobs and pension funds without proper notice
(Swartz, 2003).
Even though the general opinion describes this massive collapse as unpredictable,
Shilit and Perler (2010) affirm that the disaster could have been avoided if a careful
examination of the public documents during the preceding years of the debacle had
been performed. The impressive revenue growth from $9.2 billion in 1995 to $100.8
billion in 2000 should have warned the public, especially when considering that
profits did not increase at such spectacular rate.
Enron’s case is one of the most severe accounting scandals and audit failure of all
times, considered by many analysts and experts as the largest corporate collapse in
the U.S. history until Worldcom’s bankruptcy the following year.
Worldcom, 2002
Less than a year after Enron’s episode, the giant telecommunication services supplier
Worldcom, now known as MCI, shook the financial market when one of the most
serious book-cooking fraudulent schemes in U.S. history was uncovered, after an
internal audit revealed important accounting errors from 1999 to 2002.
By means of aggressive accounting practices, CEO Bernie Ebbers and other major
executives rigorously conceived a very complex plan that basically allowed the
company to treat $3.8 billion of operating expenses as investment, moving regular
expenditures from its statement of income to its balance sheets in order to exaggerate
profits so as to create a false image of growth Shilit and Perler (2010).
The company filed for bankruptcy protection shortly after the exposure of the
fraudulent scheme, leaving 17,000 employees laid off and an important loss of $180
billion assumed mostly by the investors and other external stakeholders.
Tyco, 2002
Tyco International Inc., a large security system company based on Princeton, New
Jersey, achieved substantial growth mainly through the acquisitions of many large
and small businesses. In fact, in a short 4-years period, more than 700 acquisitions
were made, creating a fictitious image of growth that amazed their investors from
1999 to 2002.
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The use of this particular methodology allowed Tyco to artificially increase earnings
by means of creative accounting practices and accounting loopholes, directly hiding
inconvenient transactions from the financial statements and improperly recognising
exaggerated assets from the acquired companies.
Moreover, CEO Dennis Kozlowski and CFO Mark Swartz adopted a very uncommon
and unethical praxis known as comingling of assets, that basically refers to the use of
company’s funds to pay for their personal expenses, such as properties, art pieces
and private parties, amongst others. Both top ranking officers were charged later of
stealing hundreds of millions of dollars from the company.
Parmalat, 2004
Italy’s largest milk processor Parmalat engaged in misleading accounting practices
consisting mainly of hiding gigantic debts associated with the expansionary strategy
planned during the 80s and 90s.
In particular, Parmalat’s debts were discovered to be eight times the figure the firm
had admitted and reported. Moreover, a few months after the scandal came to
light, Bank of America‘s former Chief of Corporate Finances in Italy admitted to
have participated in a kickback scheme with executive and managers of Parmalat.
It was also discovered, after a three-year trail, that several financial firms related to
Parmalat’s business and operations were participating in a complex market rigging
strategy, including Bank of America, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and UBS.
Investors and financial creditors filed a $10 billion class action suit against Parmalat‘s
auditors and administrators, as well as Bank of America, Citigroup and external
consultants, including Deloitte Touche and Grant Thornton.
Consequently, Tanzi family members, original owners of Parmalat, were arrested
and sentenced along with several senior executives responsible for the fraud scheme.
They were also investigated for intentional destruction of evidence and obstruction of
justice.
American Insurance Group (AIG), 2005
The multinational insurance corporation AIG orchestrated a massive accounting
fraud scheme that also involved a big-ridding and stock price manipulation.
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Many accounting malpractices were carefully planned by CEO Hank Greenberg
where huge loan figures were recorded as revenue, as well as secret arrangements
were negotiated with fraudulent traders to further inflate stock prices.
In consequence, a $20 billion-dollar financial penalty was settled with the SEC. CEO
Greenberg was fired but faced no criminal charges whatsoever.
Lehman Brothers, 2008
The collapse of Lehman Brothers culminated after they filed for bankruptcy in
September, 2008. Lehman’s bankruptcy filing was the largest in history considering
that its assets exceeded those of previous bankrupt giants such as Enron and
WorldCom, which contributed and intensified the 2008 financial crisis.
The scandal encompassed a colossal miscalculation of revenue and profit figures,
which was at least doubtful considering the irregularities in the U.S. housing market
and increment of defaults on subprime mortgages.
In particular, Lehman’s high degree of leverage, calculated as the ratio of total assets
to shareholders’ equity, was enormous as a result of a portfolio of risky mortgage
securities, situation that made the financial services firm increasingly vulnerable to
the deteriorating market conditions.
Many measures were adopted by Lehman Brothers to regularise its business, but it
was not enough. The stock price finally collapsed and the bankruptcy of the company
was imminent.
Toshiba, 2015
Toshiba Corporation, a multinational conglomerate company headquartered in
Tokyo, Japan, had been recently shaken by a massive accounting scandal connected
to a $1.2 billion in overstated operating profits.
Accounting improprieties and book cooking practices were discovered over the
course of seven years, strategy that was carefully planned by three former CEOs.
Inappropriate accounting practices and overstated profits in multiple Toshiba
business units began in 2008 along with the global financial crisis that had important
repercussions in Toshiba’s profitability.
The fraudulent scheme involved many tricks, including booking future profits early,
pushing back losses, pushing back charges and other similar techniques that resulted
in overstated profits.
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2.5 Victims
Like any other criminal offence, accounting fraud is considered to be a social
phenomenon since the "potential benefits for the fraudsters come at the expense of
the victims" (Baesens, Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015). Furthermore, it can be said that
accounting fraud has important negative externalities to the society as a whole, that
is, the cost to the community is much greater and harmful than the potential cost
assumed by the company in case of detection.
This issue is critical because some of the resulting externalities can potentially be
avoided by imposing stricter regulation in order to internalise them appropriately.
Hence the importance of accurately evaluating the true costs of accounting fraud and
all potential victims, including individuals, related businesses, government and the
economy, among others.
Investors
Investors allocate their capital into an institution in order to receive a positive return
in the future. There is always an intrinsic risk associated with an investment that is
taken only if the expected gain remains attractive after considering the possibility of
loss, thus the importance of making informed decisions regarding whether to invest
in a particular company or not.
Consequently, investors should make an effort to investigate what are the healthier
and more suitable options for them, and that requires putting faith in the investing
world and presuming that the financial information released by the company is
correct and truthful. Therefore, firms delivering erroneous financial reports end up
betraying their investors since they are unexpectedly assuming greater risks that
could lead to an important loss of capital.
For this reason, investors should maintain an active scepticism about financial
reporting and also perform in-depth analysis of public documents to correctly
evaluate businesses performance and position Shilit and Perler (2010).
Employees, Partners and Suppliers
As mentioned before, almost every accounting scandal results in massive collapse
or bankruptcy, which involves large corporations to cease their businesses and
consequently, hundreds of workers losing their jobs and sometimes also their
pensions.
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In addition, when a large company goes bankrupt, an important drop of its demand
occurs. In consequence, many related businesses, such as partners and suppliers, are
left without clients and subsequently out of business.
Government and Market System
Accounting scandals are usually related to audit failure, not just because internal
auditors missed or ignored falsified reports but also because public examination failed
to detect them in an early stage. This typically occurs when a fraud opportunity
appears, which means securities laws, rules and regulations were not sufficient to
ensure the proper operation of the economic system. Consequently, government
authorities, such as regulatory agencies and taxation offices, suffer a significant loss
of credibility, as well as the market system.
A very sensitive issue is faced here because one of the most precious pillars of the
economy is violated, that is, trust. Thus, in order to restore the economic confidence,
the introduction of amended initiatives usually takes place as public policy measures
seeking to improve ethical financial reporting and to promote better accounting
practices. Such is the case of the renowned Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted on July
30, 2003, as an attempt to make corporate accounting more transparent and further
protect investors and the securities market.
Creditors and Financial Analysts
Both creditors and financial analysts have to make daily financial decisions on
whether to extend credits or invest in different companies, therefore they must
rigorously analyse their financial statements and business positions, among other
attributes.
That is to say, fraudulent reporting will most probably contribute to erroneous
creditworthiness assessments and investment decisions, due to the imprecise
evaluation of associated risks; again, undermining market confidence and debilitating
the proper operation of the economic system.
All the above clearly expose the negative social and financial impact of accounting
fraud, and also evidence the urgent need for government and regulatory agencies to
invest in accurate fraud-detection systems.
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2.6 Forensic Accounting
The main goal of fraud detection is to discover hidden patterns of fraudulent activities
in order to expose them as soon as possible and, therefore, rapidly address recovery
strategies and attenuate potential losses.
Accounting fraud is a complex and dynamic phenomenon, hence the need for a deep
understanding of the underlying behaviour when designing a detection mechanism.
As such, an expert-based approach has to be built that takes into account previously
detected fraud cases to further establish rules and indicators to be used to discover
new cases of fraud (Baesens, Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015).
Current detection methods typically require manual investigation of suspicious cases
that heavily relies on human expertise, which is an incredibly costly task in terms
of time and labour. Thus, the usefulness of statistical models to help identify
questionable accounts and to further define guidelines for detecting the occurrence
of a fraudulent activity is fairly clear. Most notably, Bolton and Hand (2002) claim
that fraud detection is an important area where "statisticians can make a very
substantial and important contribution", since existing methods are outdated and, in
consequence, perform poorly examination of public documents.
Broadly speaking, a detection mechanism should satisfy three essential conditions in
order to be successful, including accuracy, interpretability and efficiency (Baesens,
Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015). Accuracy, in terms of achieving high levels of
detection power, specifically when dealing with suspicious cases, as well as the
ability to generalise results to unknown observations; interpretability, as to properly
communicate the relevant information in a simple manner so it can be integrated
and later utilised by all interested parties; and efficiency, with regard to meeting time
constraints, operational requirements and cost restrictions.
All of the above clearly shows the convenience of a data-based approach to help
conceive an adequate and integral fraud-detection method, to be used to identify clear
signs of fraudulent financial reporting and further assist a more comprehensive and
objective examination of corporate financial reports.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that several forensic accounting-similar approaches
have been adopted in related fields to, for instance, identify money laundering
(Ravenda, Argilés-Bosch, and Valencia-Silva, 2015) and organised crime infiltration in
organisations and firms (Savona and Berlusconi, 2015), which evidence the usefulness
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of this kind of methodologies to detect, predict and tackle different corporate and
financial crimes.
2.7 Literature Review
Prior Studies Overview
Part of the fraudulent financial reporting literature has focused primarily in the
evaluation of qualitative characteristics related to the board of directors and principal
executives, including information of corporate governance structure (Beasley, 1996;
Hansen et al., 1996; Bell and Carcello, 2000) and insider trading data (Summers
and Sweeney, 1998). Studies using this kind of information show promising results;
however, getting access to such data is very difficult and sometimes even prohibited
for most individuals.
On the other hand, studies using publicly available financial statement information
are less common and usually incorporate small samples. Generally, the selection of
fraud cases is limited to certain conditions and manually matched with non-fraud
observations on the basis of business fundamentals, such as industry, size, maturity,
period and more. Undoubtedly, there is an interesting gap in this area of the literature
where the selection process of a more representative sample has the potential to be
explored and expanded, which is intended to be filled in the present study.
With regard to the employed techniques, discriminant analysis and logistic regression
are by far the most popular. Such algorithms are commonly considered as a
benchmark framework due to their simplicity and low computational cost, and
because they have been proven to efficiently detect falsified accounting reporting
in relatively small samples (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Spathis, Doumpos, and
Zopounidis, 2002; Kaminski, Wetzel, and Guan, 2004; Pai, Hsu, and Wang, 2011).
In particular, discriminant analysis (DA) has been used in a variety of disciplines,
including bankruptcy prediction of public companies (Altman, 1968), marketing
research (Crask and Perreault, 1977) and medical studies (Yarnold, Soltysik, and
Martin, 1994; Yarnold et al., 1995), amongst others. However, results of the application
of DA for detecting accounting fraud are not very promising, as can be seen in
Kaminski, Wetzel, and Guan (2004), where an exploratory analysis is designed to
investigate whether financial ratios are useful to detect fraud, concluding that there is
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no significant difference in the ratios of fraudulent versus non-fraudulent firms. The
results obtained in this study are fairly inaccurate, since the absolutely opposite is
shown in what remains of this thesis. In fact, it has been found that financial ratios
are significant predictors of accounting fraud offences, as important differences can
be identified when comparing fraudulent and non-fraudulent corporations.
A great deal of work has been done using logistic regression (LR), as an alternative
approach to discriminant analysis. For instance, Persons (1995) applies two
stepwise-logistic regression models, one to predict fraud in the first year of occurrence
and the other for the preceding year. Results suggest that both models outperform
a naive strategy of classifying all firms as non-fraud and that it is easier to detect
firms that are most likely to commit fraud (using preceding-year information), than
to detect fraudulent firms (using fraud-year information).
Likewise, Lee, Ingram, and Howard (1999) develop a logistic regression model
to examine the relationship between earnings over operating cash flow and
accounting fraud. The results indicate that the excess of the difference between the
aforementioned financial items is extreme in most fraud firms in years immediately
prior to the fraud violation. Spathis (2002) also applies a logistic procedure,
demonstrating that the model performs effectively in detecting fraudulent reports,
since it correctly classifies 84% of all cases. Initially, he uses a set of 17 financial
ratios as explanatory variables, and concludes that only ten are selected as potential
predictors of false financial reporting. He concludes that variable selection can be very
useful for accounting fraud detection, claim that is supported by the results obtained
in the present study.
In a similar fashion, Lenard, Watkins, and Alam (2007) use a logistic regression
approach to predict falsified financial statements in service-based computer and
technology firms. In addition to popular financial ratios, they include a ‘fuzzy logic’
variable to assess the impact of non-financial red-flags in the occurrence of fraudulent
reporting. The proposed model shows an overall accuracy of 77%, suggesting that the
inclusion of the proposed variable enhanced the classification accuracy significantly.
More recently, Dalnial et al. (2014) analyse the usefulness of financial ratios as
predictors of fraudulent accounting reporting. They use a sample of Malaysian public
firms for training a logistic regression model, reaching an overall accuracy of 75% and
concluding that several financial ratios such as total debt to total assets and receivables
to revenue are significantly helpful for accounting fraud detection.
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Decision trees (DT) are another well-known machine learning method often used to
predict fraudulent accounting records, mainly due to their fewer data preparation
requirements and their intuitive interpretation. To illustrate, Gupta and Gill (2012)
design a data mining methodology for preventing and detecting accounting fraud,
concluding that decision trees are superior in terms of accuracy than other statistical
methods such as genetic programming, since they correctly classified 95% of all cases,
specifically 98% of non-fraudulent firms and 86% of fraudulent firms.
Similarly, Pai, Hsu, and Wang (2011) introduce a fraud warning model to assess
the likelihood of falsified financial reports. They build a support vector machine
for detecting fraudulent firms and then develop a decision tree model, in order
to establish easy-to-grasp rules that can be used by auditors for accounting fraud
detection. The proposed algorithm outperforms the other three approaches -
discriminant analysis, logistic regression and neural networks - in terms of testing
accuracy.
Alternative approaches have also been adopted in order to detect accounting fraud:
Neural networks (NNs) are particularly popular for this end, showing promising
results when predicting fraudulent accounting practices. Kwon and Feroz (1996)
investigate the efficacy of several red flags in predicting reporting violations. They
compare the results of a neural network and a logistic regression model, concluding
that the neural network approach outperformed by more than 40% in terms of average
classification accuracy.
In addition, Choi and Green (1997) develop three back-propagation NNs using
different expectation methods in order to transform the percentage change between
the reported and the expected account balance of the fraud-year. The results are robust
for all the three models, since Type I and Type II errors are significantly less than
a naive strategy of random choice, suggesting that neural networks have significant
potential as accounting fraud detection tool.
Furthermore, Fanning and Cogger (1998) conclude that the use of public documents
is particularly helpful for detecting falsified financial statements and that neural
networks greatly outperform standard statistical methods for predicting fraudulent
reporting practices, such as logistic regression and discriminant analysis. In addition,
Feroz et al. (2000) test the ability of NNs and conclude that they perform better than
conventional logistic regression, and confirm that financial ratios calculated from
publicly available data have significant predictive value.
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Later on, Kirkos, Spathis, and Manolopoulos (2007) compare the relative performance
of NNs and other techniques, such as decision trees and Bayesian networks, using a
stratified 10-fold cross validation approach. They concluded that Bayesian networks
generally outperform the other two methods, while decision trees exhibit the lowest
performance in terms of classification accuracy.
A last application of a NNs approach can be seen in Ravisankar et al. (2011) where they
examine the usefulness of various data mining techniques - neural networks, support
vector machines, genetic programming and logistic regression - for the detection of
fraudulent Chinese firms, with and without feature selection. Results suggest that the
t-statistic technique is a simple and effective approach for selecting significant features
and that NNs outperformed all remaining methods in both scenarios.
More complex settings have been proposed, using an assemblage of several machine
learning methods to better understand the accounting fraud phenomenon and
to improve its detection rate. For example, Kotsiantis et al. (2006) develop a
hybrid decision support system that merges different techniques such as decision
trees, artificial neural networks, Bayesian networks, logistic regression and support
vector machines, achieving better results compared to the aforementioned methods
employed individually.
Later on, Song et al. (2014) propose an ensemble of four machine learning techniques,
including logistic regression, decision trees, neural networks and support vector
machines, in order to assess the risk of fraud. The experimental results indicate
that the suggested approach outperform the above methods showing a classification
accuracy of 89%.
Nevertheless, the achieved performance of neural networks and more complex
methodologies, such as Bayesian networks, support vector machines and hybrid
algorithms, is counteracted by the considerable drawbacks that these methods
entail, including important computational costs and overfitting proneness, as well
as struggling when interpreting results (Tu, 1996).
Finally, Shilit and Perler (2010) conceive a guide to detect accounting gimmicks and
fraud in financial statement reports. They discover several financial shenanigans
adopted by fraudulent firms, including improper recording of revenue, shifting of
expenses and/or income to other periods and irregular disclosure of liabilities, among
others. Consequently, the authors conclude that many accounting scandals and
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corporate collapses could have been avoided if a careful examination of the public
documents during the preceding years of the event had been performed, and that
using the suggested clues could be beneficial to further warn the public before a
disaster occurs.
A summary table including all prior studies using machine learning techniques is
provided next. More details can also be observed (Table 2.1), such as sample size,
number of fraud cases, methods employed and overall accuracy when available.
Predictors of Accounting Fraud
Different and diverse explanatory variables have been considered in previously
mentioned studies, including financial statement items, financial ratios and corporate
governance information. Nevertheless, the most common predictors adopted for
accounting fraud detection are financial ratios, mainly because it has been shown that
these types of variables have a great predictive capacity.
Table 2.2 summarises the most popular financial ratios used in the literature and
the reference to the studies at issue. A more detailed discussion of these and more
financial ratios is performed in Chapter 4, as well as a comprehensive analysis of how
they are manipulated, the relationship between them and their statistical significance
when detecting accounting fraud.
Research Considerations
Many contributions can be attributed to prior studies, as all accounting fraud research
enhance awareness and knowledge of this phenomenon and further support its
detection and anti-fraud preventive measures. However, a great deal of work that
can be further done to improve detection strategies in many ways, including sample
size, industries at issue, machine learning methods and evaluation metrics.
Firstly, it can be observed from Table 2.1 that sample sizes of previous studies are
fairly small. In most studies, samples are manually selected, which is a highly
problematic practice as it is inherently biased and so results cannot be extrapolated
to the population. Therefore, increasing the amount of data used to train and test
the models is a noticeable enhancement, as well as attempting to collect as many
fraudulent cases as possible, and not only the most convenient for the sake of research
results.
Secondly, most prior studies focus their analysis in specific industries defined by the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. After careful review, it is surprisingly
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TABLE 2.1: Prior studies in detecting accounting fraud
Study SampleSize
Fraud
Cases Method(s)
Overall
Accuracy (%)
Persons (1995) 206 103 Logistic Regression n/a
Kwon & Feroz (1996) 70 35
Neural Networks
Logistic Regression
88
47
Choi and Green (1997) 172 86 Neural Networks n/a
Fanning & Cogger (1998) 204 102
Logistic Regression
Discriminant Analysis
Neural Networks
50
52
63
Lee et al. (1999) 620 56 Logistic Regression n/a
Feroz et al. (2000) 132 42
Neural Networks
Logistic Regression
81
70
Spathis (2002) 76 38 Logistic Regression 84
Spathis et al. (2002) 76 38
Multicriteria Decision Aid Method
Discriminant Analysis
Logistic Regression
88
84
81
Lin et al. (2003) 200 40
Neural Networks
Logistic Regression
76
79
Kaminski et al. (2004) 158 79 Discriminant Analysis n/a
Kotsiantis et al. (2006) 164 41
Decision Trees
Neural Networks
Bayesian Networks
Logistic Regression
Support Vector Machines
Hybrid Decision Support System
91
80
74
75
79
95
Kirkos et al. (2007) 76 38
Decision Trees
Neural Networks
Bayesian Networks
74
80
90
Hoogs et al. (2007) 390 51 Genetic Programming n/a
Lenard et al. (2007) 30 15 Logistic Regression 77
Ravisankar et al. (2011) 202 101
Support Vector Machines
Genetic Programming
Logistic Regression
Neural Networks
72
89
71
91
Pai et al. (2011) 75 25
Support Vector Machines
Discriminant Analysis
Logistic Regression
Decision Trees
Neural Networks
92
81
79
84
83
Gupta & Singh (2012) 114 29
Decision Trees
Genetic Programming
95
88
Danial et al. (2014) 130 65 Logistic Regression 75
Song et al. (2014) 550 110
Logistic Regression
Decision Trees
Neural Networks
Support Vector Machines
78
79
85
86
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TABLE 2.2: Most popular explanatory variables for detecting AF
Predictor Study
NITA
Persons (1995)
Spathis (2002)
Spathis et al. (2002)
Kaminski et al. (2004)
Kirkos et al. (2007)
Lenard et al. (2007)
Ravisankar et al. (2011)
Pai et al. (2011)
Gupta et al. (2012)
Danial et al. (2014)
Song et al. (2014)
TLTA
Persons (1995)
Spathis (2002)
Spathis et al. (2002)
Kaminski et al. (2004)
Kotsiantis et al. (2006)
Lenard et al. (2007)
Pai et al. (2011)
Song et al. (2014)
WCTA
Spathis (2002)
Spathis et al. (2002)
Kaminski et al. (2004)
Kotsiantis et al. (2006)
Kirkos et al. (2007)
Pai et al (2011)
RVSA
Fanning & Cogger (1998)
Feroz et al. (2000)
Kaminski et al. (2004)
Pai et al. (2011)
Schilit and Perler (2010)
SATA
Fanning & Cogger (1998)
Spathis (2002)
Kotsiantis et al. (2006)
Kirkos et al. (2007)
Lenard et al. (2007)
CACL
Kotsiantis et al. (2006)
Lenard et al. (2007)
Ravisankar et al. (2011)
Song et al. (2014)
IVSA
Fanning & Cogger (1998)
Spathis (2002)
Spathis et al. (2002)
Pai et al. (2011)
IVTA
Ravisankar et al. (2011)
Gupta et al. (2012)
Danial et al. (2014)
Song et al. (2014)
observed (Table 2.1) that there are no studies that investigate accounting fraud within
financial services firms. The main reason for this exclusion is that they are structurally
different and an alternative set of variables may be required since certain financial
statement items, such as accounts receivable and inventory, are not available for these
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companies. Hence "research to find the variables most useful in the specific industries
would be of great value", especially in the poorly examined area of financial services
(Fanning and Cogger, 1998). As such, a substantial improvement is achieved in the
present study as cases from all industries are included.
In brief, it can be said that although the existing techniques have increased the
detection rate of accounting fraud offences, these are very limited and often not
sufficient to uncover complex fraudulent schemes, hence the need for improved
methodologies that comply with the aforementioned basic principles of accuracy,
interpretability and efficiency (Chapter 2.6).
2.8 Proposed Methodology
By means of this thesis, it is proposed to implement an analytical approach that
pursues the detection and control of accounting fraud offences. For this reason,
an Accounting Fraud Detection and Control methodology will be elaborated that
involves four key elements: (i) the accounting element as a financial concept; (ii)
the fraud element determined by a particular criminal behaviour; (iii) the element of
detection associated with the exposure of the criminal behaviour; and (iv) the element
of control that implies more effective detection strategies.
The first element of accounting is directly associated with how the economic system
works. Most modern corporations are always looking to maximise their profits,
which are more certainly monetary. As such, accounting reporting is the best
way for companies to communicate to internal and external stakeholders about
the operation of their businesses. Consequently, information about corporate
performance, activities and decisions are usually summarised in financial statements
and reports, which are expected to be align with universal generally accepted
accounting standards. In light of this, it is reasonable to suggest close examination
of abnormal behaviour and suspicious patterns that may be indicating illegitimate
corporate activities.
For this end, it is required to understand the phenomenon and to identify most
common fraudulent practices. In other word, to recognise fraudulent criminal
behaviours (second element). The identification of criminal behaviours and abnormal
financial patterns should be accomplished objectively and accurately, which is why
statistical modelling is so attractive in this context. A representative modelling of
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the accounting fraud phenomenon will greatly support the effective exposure of the
criminal behaviour, which relates to the third element of the proposed approach.
In order to improve the detection of accounting fraud offences, analytical models are
required first to identify companies that behave in an abnormal way, and second to
recognise what accounting tricks are these firms employing to hide poor financial
performance. Once the modelling task is accomplished, guidelines for more effective
and efficient examination of financial reports are fairly easy to obtain and further be
included as part of a comprehensive and adaptive control strategy, which correspond
to the final element of the suggested methodology.
Considering all of the above, it is proposed to apply a forensic data analysis approach
to: (i) create an extensive accounting fraud database consisting of fraud cases from
all industry areas and financial statement information for both fraud and non-fraud
firms; (ii) handle the collected data set; (iii) evaluate differences in financial accounts
between corrupted and genuine reports; (iv) examine distinctive characteristics of
fraudulent and non-fraudulent financial statements; (v) implement several machine
learning methods in order to better differentiate between fraud and non-fraud cases;
and ultimately (vi) identify industry-specific financial indicators to be used as ‘red
flags’ for accounting reporting examination. These are, thereby, the specific goals of
this thesis.
2.9 Summary
In order to properly approach the phenomenon of accounting fraud, a comprehensive
understanding of corporate financial malpractices was required. In this regard, an
overview of the wider topics of white-collar crime and corporate crime is elaborated,
followed by an exhaustive analysis of the behavioural aspect of accounting fraud,
most severe cases of accounting scandals and potential victims.
In addition, a critical literature review has been performed to account for research
achievements and good practices, as well as to identify relevant shortcomings related
to accounting fraud analysis and further detection. Finally, taking everything into
consideration, a thorough methodology has been proposed to ultimately achieve the
desired research objectives.
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Forensic Data Analysis
3.1 Forensic Analytics
Accounting fraud perpetrators are continuously conceiving new ways to commit their
offences and, in consequence, always transforming their fraudulent behaviour, thus
the complexity of the accounting fraud phenomenon. This deliberate managerial
wrongdoing is particularly hard to detect and predict, since it involves deep
knowledge of accounting and legal tricks that are intentionally employed to make
documents look genuine and error-free. As such, a data-driven detection mechanism
is suggested, based on publicly available financial statement information, to be used
by all related parties interested in discovering sophisticated fraudulent schemes.
Forensic data analysis is concerned with the treatment and examination of financial
crime offences, hence the relevance of its use to develop an adequate technique for
fraud detection. In particular, a forensic accounting approach is proposed in order
to overcome potential auditing failure and further improve examination of public
documents through the recommendation of meaningful examination of accounting
items.
One of the most important elements of a data-driven mechanism is, without a doubt,
the data. Not only the tangible record of fraudulent and non-fraudulent offences, but
also how it is registered and displayed, what transformation and further handling
procedures are needed, what additional information should be included, which
should be removed and what sample should be selected.
It is generally known that valuable analytical models rely on clean and organised data
to be used to generate the required methodological conditions before proceeding with
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further analysis (Baesens, Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015). Accordingly, data collection,
preparation and validation play a crucial role in forensic analytics, particularly when
dealing with financial statement items as they are expected to align with universal
generally accepted accounting standards.
A careful description of the implemented data handling process and sample selection
methodology is explained in what follows.
3.2 Fraud Data Collection
The data collection task is critical in crime-related research, since it is very difficult
to find sufficient and accurate data for analysis. In addition, and given the highly
sensitive nature of the topic, there is a limited amount of relevant journal articles
related to accounting fraud detection, and publication of controversial results may
be censored or even prohibited (Bolton and Hand, 2002). Therefore, a compilation
of an exhaustive and representative database containing relevant cases of accounting
fraud instances is imperative to further achieve the proposed objective.
In this study, accounting fraud cases are identified considering all Accounting
Series Releases (ASR) and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER)
issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between 1990 and
2012. Particularly, all public litigation releases involving deceptive reporting were
hand-collected first from the SEC’s website1 and then cross-validated with an official
fraud-database provided by the Securities and Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC),
Stanford Law School. This accredited data set was obtained after the enactment of a
non-disclosure agreement between the involved parties.
The selection of the studied period is justified based on data availability and
practicality considerations. On the one hand, discovered fraud cases published by
the SEC include successful enforcement actions with monetary sanctions exceeding
$1 million announced between July 29, 2002 and present. Accounting fraud cases
released by the SEC date from 1990 onwards, hence the selection of the year 1990
as the beginning of the studied period. On the other hand, this study began in the
middle of 2013, so including this year would be incorrect considering that many cases
1SEC Sanctions Database: https://www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/program/
sec-enforcement/sanctions-database/
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of fraud could be discovered in the remainder of the year. As such, 2012 is selected as
the final year of the studied period.
Lastly, two main considerations should be taken into account regarding the collected
data. First, non-public firms were excluded as the SEC only has jurisdiction over
publicly traded companies. Second, the non-fraud cases collected may contain firms
that have engaged in fraud but have not been discovered, which could be influencing
findings and results. More about the latter is discussed in Chapter 8.
3.3 Financial Data Collection
In addition to the aforementioned compilation of publicly known fraud offences, a
collection of financial statement information is required for further modelling, as
this data will be used to identify frequent accounting tricks adopted to improperly
modify financial reports. The rationale behind the use of financial statement data
is that this source of information should be enough to fairly reveal the value of a
firm (Ou and Penman, 1989). A relevant analysis of financial statements generally
allows the extraction of significant information regarding the true financial worth of
an institution, its accounting structure and financial performance.
Accordingly, the collection of published financial statement data corresponding to
all public companies was gathered from the COMPUSTAT files in the interest of
creating an integrated database containing relevant accounting information related
to fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms for the pertinent time period, that is, from
1990 to 2012.
COMPUSTAT is a data-repository containing several databases related to financial,
statistical and market information from companies all around the world, covering
99% of the world’s total market capitalisation. Many interested parties benefit from
the information provided by this platform, such as investors, academic researchers,
bankers, analysts, advisors and portfolio managers, among others. COMPUSTAT
provides a broad range of relevant information, including annual and quarterly
business fundamentals, and pricing and property data. More than 300 annual and 100
quarterly documents can be found, covering information related to Income Statement,
Balance Sheet and Cash Flows, as well as supplemental data items on more than
24,000 active and inactive publicly held companies.
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Financial statements are formal documents reflecting the financial status of a
company. It is required that all publicly traded businesses release this information
every quarter and year so it can be audited by government agencies and public
auditors, amongst others, in order to ensure its legitimacy and accuracy. The data
provided in the financial statements usually involve records associated with income
statements, balance sheets and cash flows, and as such, will be considered as relevant
financial information to be used for statistical modelling.
In particular, 17 financial items are collected from annual financial statements since
they are required to further create explanatory variables commonly used as fraud
predictors by previous studies (Chapter 2.7). A brief explanation of the chosen
financial items is given using the official definition provided by COMPUSTAT, unless
otherwise specified.
3.3.1 Balance Sheet
The balance sheet statement is one of the key sources of data for analysing the book
value of a company. It is usually published at the end of the fiscal year and comprises
three main business components: assets, liabilities and shareholders’ equity. The
relationship of these items is expressed in the fundamental balance sheet equation
given by the following formula:
Assets = Liabilities+ Equity (3.1)
In other words, it can be said that the net worth of the company is the difference
between its assets and liabilities. A detailed description of these three elements can
be found next:
1. Assets: all tangible and intangible resources with economic value that a
company owns and has in its possession, or that eventually will receive and
acquire as its property.
Selected financial items related to assets are defined below:
• Total Assets (TA): This item represents the total assets of a company at a
point in time. If the company does not report a useable amount, this data
item will be left blank.
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• Current Assets (CA): This item is a component of Total Assets (TA) and
represents cash and other assets that are expected to be realised in cash or
used in the production of revenue within the next 12 months. This item is
not available for banks.
• Cash (CH): This item is a component of Cash and Short-Term Investments
which in turn is a component of Current Assets (CA), and represents any
immediately negotiable medium of exchange or any instruments normally
accepted by banks for deposit and immediate credit to a customer’s
account.
• Accounts Receivable (RV): This item is a component of Current Assets
(CA) and represents asset designation applicable to all debts, unsettled
transactions or other monetary obligations owed to a company by its
debtors or customers2.
• Inventory (IV): This is a component of Current Assets (CA) and represents
merchandise bought for resale and materials and supplies purchased for
use in production of revenue.
2. Liabilities: all financial debt or obligations that must be paid under contractual
conditions and time frames. Liabilities are typically used to finance operations
and pay for potential business expansions.
Selected financial items related to liabilities are defined below:
• Total Liabilities (TL): This item represents current liabilities plus long-term
debt plus other non-current liabilities, including deferred taxes and
investment tax credit.
• Current Liabilities (CL): This item is a component of Total Liabilities (TL)
and represents liabilities due within one year, including the current portion
of long-term debt. This item is not available for banks.
• Accounts Payable (PY): This item is a component of Current Liabilities (CL)
and represents only trade obligations due within one year or the normal
operating cycle of the company.
2Definition obtained from Investopedia: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/
receivables.asp
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• Long-Term Debt (LTD): This item is a component of Total Liabilities
(TL) and represents debt obligations due more than one year from the
company’s balance sheet date.
3. Shareholders’ Equity: retained earnings and funds contributed by shareholders
that take the risk of investing in a particular company. It can be seen as the return
on stockholders’ investment or, in other words, shareholders’ ownership of the
company’s assets.
Selected financial items related to equity are defined below:
• Total Equity (TE): This item represents the common and preferred
shareholders’ interest in the company.
• Retained Earnings (RE): This item is a component of Total Equity (TE)
and represents the cumulative earnings of the company less total dividend
distributions to shareholders.
One last financial item related to the balance sheet statement not contained in the
categories of Assets, Liabilities or Equity, is defined below:
• Working Capital (WC): This item represents the difference between total current
assets minus total current liabilities as reported on a company’s Balance Sheet.
This item is not available for banks.
3.3.2 Income Statement
The Income Statement is a financial report that accounts for a company’s earnings for
a given time period. In particular, it shows the incoming revenues for the specified
period in addition to the associated outgoing expenses.
Selected financial items related to income statements are defined below:
• Net Income (NI): This item represents the fiscal period income or loss reported
by a company after subtracting expenses and losses from all revenues and gains.
• Total Sales (SA): This item represents gross sales (the amount of actual billings
to customers for regular sales completed during the period) reduced by cash
discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales and allowances for which credit
is given to customers, for each operating segment.
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• Cost of Good Sold (COGS): This item represents all costs directly allocated by
the company to production, such as material, labour and overhead.
• Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT): This item is the sum of Total Sales (SA)
minus expenses, excluding tax and interest3.
3.3.3 Cash Flow
The Cash Flow statement is a financial report that describes incoming and outgoing
funds in both balance sheet and income statements that affect cash and cash
equivalents. In other words, it specifies the movement of cash in and out of a business.
In particular, it shows all flows related to operating, investing and financing activities.
Selected financial items related to cash flow statements are defined below:
• Cash Flow From Operations (CFFO): This item represents the net change in cash
from all items classified in the Operating Activities section on a Statement of
Cash Flows, where increases in cash are presented as positive numbers and
decreases in cash appear as negative numbers. This item is not available for
banks.
3.4 Data Preparation
A rigorous preparation of the collected data must be conducted after the first stage of
collection. As explained, two sources of information have been collected, including
accounting fraud cases and financial statement data, both in need for profound
handling and preparation, as raw data being noticeably messy.
Data preparation is specially challenging considering the size of the resulting
dataset in terms of number of observations and number of variables. Preparing
the data includes mainly the tasks of data cleaning, data transformation, data
merging, treatment of missing values and data validation, all carefully described and
documented below.
3Definition obtained from Investopedia: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/ebit.asp
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3.4.1 Data Cleaning
In the context of accounting fraud, the data cleaning task primarily involves ensuring
that the sample collected includes nothing but recognisable public companies within
the period of interest. Consequently, several exclusions were required and further
conducted, such as:
• Removal of all fraud and non-fraud instances that occurred before the year 1990
and after the year 2012.
• Removal of duplicated data. Duplications occur when two or more observations
share the same information regarding the company and the year at issue.
Companies are easily identifiable using features such as company name, GVKEY,
ticker symbol, CUSIP and CIK number. Years at issue are based on fiscal year
indexing rather than calendar data.
• Removal of firms with undisclosed or non-applicable/unclear identification,
again based on identifying features as mention above.
3.4.2 Data Transformation
All collected instances related to fraud offences are fully defined by the company that
committed the violation, as well as the period of time in which the violation occurred.
In this way, when a fraud is perpetrated for more than a year, then it is required to
partition the case into year-instances to further combine them with the relevant annual
financial statement information.
This procedure results in 1,594 fraud-year observations again characterised entirely
by company I.D. and the associated fiscal year of the offence. Table 3.1 summarises
the number of fraudulent observations obtained after splitting fraud cases into the
corresponding years of occurrence, particularly arranged by industry area of where
companies belong to.
More details on the subsectors included in each industry will be extensively discuss
in Chapter 4.
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TABLE 3.1: Fraud cases by industry
SIC Standard Industrial Fraud Perc
Codes Classification (SIC) Cases (%)
0100 - 0999 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 11 0.69
1000 - 1799 Mining and Construction 52 3.26
2000 - 3999 Manufacturing 609 38.21
4000 - 4999 Transportation, Communications, Electric and Gas 106 6.65
5000 - 5999 Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade 169 10.60
6000 - 6799 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 236 14.81
7000 - 8999 Services 375 23.53
9100 - 9729 Public Administration 36 2.26
1,594 100
3.4.3 Data Merging
In order to apply a forensic analytical approach, it is convenient to present the
collected information in a single table as it is easier to process and analyse the data
when it is stored in a structured manner. Occasionally, when data tables are combined,
important errors are made especially when a great deal of observations are involved.
Hence the need for detailed scrutiny of the resulting tables to make sure that the data
is correctly integrated (Baesens, Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015).
On that account, both collected sources of information, that is, fraud cases by year and
annual financial statement data, have to be merged. These datasets are combined into
one final table using company I.D. and year as merge keys. The resulting database
consists of all public companies existing during the studied period, their identifying
information, company description, financial statement items and the corresponding
fraud or non-fraud flag.
3.4.4 Data Validation
Once a comprehensive data table has been conceived, the validation of the collected
data must be performed, as only valid instances should be considered for further
analysis. Nevertheless, the validation of the data is a different process depending
on the context in which the study is being conducted.
In the case of accounting data, financial statement validation is a very important
part of the data preparation process. A common practice when validating financial
statements is what is called accounting reconciliation, which basically consists in
ensuring that two or more figures are accurate and in agreement. This process is
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mainly used to determine whether financial amounts match across different sections
of financial reports, and that calculations are made in a legitimate manner.
That being said, the following account reconciliations are evaluated and justified
when appropriate:
• Ensure that equation 3.1 is met, that is, the sum of the values related to total
liabilities and shareholders’ equity is equal to total assets.
• Ensure total assets are positive figures, since it is inaccurate to define assets as
negative figures, as well as businesses that exist without total assets.
• Ensure total liabilities are not negative, as negative values are most likely invalid
observations.
• Ensure working capital is equal to the difference between current assets and
current liabilities, as properly defined in Section 3.1.
• Ensure total sales figures are positive, otherwise there is no economic activity,
which certainly suggests invalid observations.
• Ensure inventory figures are not negative, as negative values have no economic
meaning.
• Ensure accounts receivable are not negative, as negative figures have no
economic meaning either.
3.4.5 Missing Values
Missing values are very common in the process of data preparation, especially when
working with COMPUSTAT data. This situation usually occurs due to differences
in reporting formats or structural changes of the databases over time. On the one
hand, reports may differ from firms belonging to different industries or that have
presence in foreign countries, hence dissimilar accounting standards will determine
their financial accounts. On the other hand, it is also possible that COMPUSTAT
databases are adjusted from time to time, resulting for example, in new variables
that only contain entries for current periods and not for older years, or conventional
variables that become meaningless when replaced by up-to-date features.
Several techniques are typically employed to deal with missing data, including: (i)
keeping missing values as a separate category, particularly when considered to be
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meaningful; (ii) replacing missing values with the value of zero; (iii) replacing the
missing value with a well-known central tendency measure, such as mean, median
or mode; (iv) replacing missing values with an estimated figure obtained from a
regression-based technique; or simply (v) deleting observations or variables with a
great number of missing values (Baesens, Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015).
The most straightforward option of deleting observations with missing values, is
adopted in the present study. The rationale behind this decision is that speculating on
the legitimate value of a particular financial item for a particular entity seems fairly
irresponsible considering how sensitive the topic of accounting fraud is. Estimated
financial figures may be reasonably close to the actual value, but when not the
case, fictitious results may be obtained from analytical models, and in consequence,
incorrect classification of non-fraudulent and fraudulent firms. This is an interesting
exercise that could be tested in future work.
Thereby, observations containing missing values within relevant financial items, will
be deleted as follows:
• Drop observation if total assets figure is missing: undisclosed values of total
assets have no practical meaning as no firms can exist without assets.
• Drop observation if missing sales: missing total sales figures represent
non-existent economic activity, hence the business is not valid.
• Drop observation if missing net income: similarly, no income means no
economic activity, thus not a valid observation.
As a result of the adopted missing values treatment methodology, 15% of the database
originally collected has been dropped.
3.5 Sample Selection
One of the main characteristics that defines the fraud phenomenon so uniquely is that
it is an uncommon activity (Chapter 2), particularly in the context of accounting fraud
since only a minority of the recorded cases are actually classified as fraudulent.
Learning from these rare events is a very challenging task given the small amount
of observations available to train predictive models, hence especially difficult to
further discriminate between fraudulent and non-fraudulent instances. As Cerullo
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and Cerullo, 1999 express in regards to this matter, “unrepresentative sample data
or too few data observations will result in a model that poorly estimates or predicts
future values".
The class-imbalance problem fully emerges when statistical learning models are
applied, because they all opt for a naive strategy of classifying all firms as
non-fraudulent. As a consequence, accuracy measures show excellent average
performance that only reflect the underlying uneven class distribution. Nevertheless,
the methods are totally ineffective in detecting positive cases (Chawla, Japkowicz, and
Kotcz, 2004).
Therefore, the selection of a representative sample is required in order to solve the
imbalance problem encountered in this study, and also to enhance the discriminatory
power of the proposed statistical models. The number of fraud cases in the collected
dataset only represents a 0.8% of all observations, hence a stratified sampling method
is implemented for the selection of non-fraud cases.
Thereby, the stratifying exercise is conducted according to the target variable Fraud,
as it matches exactly the same amount of fraud observations as in the original data,
specifically on the basis of industry area and fiscal period. Consequently, the sample
selection process occurs in two phases, first dividing the dataset by industry and then
by year.
A variety of sampling methods can be employed when dealing with imbalanced
datasets, individually or in combination, hence an extensive and interesting analysis
could be done to select suitable samples of fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases. A
more detailed discussion about this topic is addressed in Chapter 8.
3.6 Exploratory Descriptive Analysis
In order to better understand the data and the phenomenon of interest, an exploratory
analysis is conducted including temporal distribution of fraud cases, as well as
descriptive statistics visual exploration of the distribution of the collected financial
statement information.
It can be observed from Figure 3.1 that most fraud cases were taken place between
1999 and 2002, which coincides with the occurrence of many accounting scandals,
such as Enron, Worldcom and Tyco, among others.
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In the years following the aforementioned corporate collapses, the number of fraud
cases declines significantly. This suggests an important impact of fraud discovery
as a discourage mechanism, mainly due to the fear of being discovered as well as
the increment of corporate regulation and oversight further enacted to help prevent
accounting fraud and malpractices.
FIGURE 3.1: Fraud cases by year
Interesting characteristics can be noticed from Table 3.2 about the collected dataset.
First, large range and standard deviation of total assets stand from the table, which
means companies of all sizes are included in the sample. Second, high absolute values
of skewness and kurtosis suggest asymmetric distribution of most financial items,
which is quite expected as companies of all sizes and industries have been considered.
Furthermore, boxplots of all financial items have been constructed in order to explore
the relationship between them and the response variable Fraud.
Presence of outliers can be seen in most cases, for both fraud and non-fraud groups.
In addition, higher variation in the case of fraudulent firms is observable in several
financial items, including CA, CL, TE, NI, SA and COGS. The distribution of the data
regarding TA, RV, IV, TL, PY, RE and EBIT appears to be similar in both groups. More
about distribution of the data and important difference between fraud and non-fraud
cases will be extensively discussed in the next chapter.
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(A) TA (B) CA
(C) CH (D) RV
(E) IV (F) TL
(G) CL (H) PY
FIGURE 3.2: Boxplots of examined financial items for non-fraud and
fraud firms
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(I) TE (J) RE
(K) WC (L) NI
(M) SA (N) COGS
(O) EBIT (P) CFFO
FIGURE 3.2: Boxplots of examined financial items for non-fraud and
fraud firms (continued)
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TABLE 3.2: Descriptive statistics of selected financial statement items
Item Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
TA 22495.31 153227.40 0 2359141 10.565 128.601
CA 1160.71 4845.78 0 96853 9.161 114.911
CH 496.01 2890.65 0 59602 11.958 177.477
RV 8260.99 63665.26 0 994847 10.580 125.770
IV 1669.36 20832.87 0 472266 18.487 364.381
TL 20177.11 144472.90 0 2155072 10.516 126.474
CL 983.73 4751.81 0 111604 10.962 171.183
PY 5822.05 59749.21 0 1193593 14.153 220.468
LTD 4421.26 32539.25 0 486876 10.955 135.037
TE 2218.39 10902.03 -30731 204069 11.163 160.561
RE 1016.95 6782.13 -55548 117260 8.345 113.133
WC 176.98 2367.02 -111604 19877 -32.178 1568.497
NI 137.94 2191.30 -58707 21284 -11.170 308.495
SA 4687.70 18001.12 0 297107 7.471 76.364
COGS 3052.69 12788.18 0 245165 8.916 110.310
EBIT 834.39 4881.48 -10537 88847 9.361 108.142
CFFO 421.12 4981.35 -110560 121897 3.335 286.323
3.7 Summary
In Chapter 3, a comprehensive analytical approach is proposed to properly gather
and prepare a representative sample of fraud and non-fraud cases, as well as relevant
financial information related to both fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms. After
the collection process, several tasks associated with the manipulation of raw data
are taken place, including data cleaning, data transformation, data merging, data
validation and missing values treatment.
Finally, a clean, organised and structured database is achieved and analysed, which
leads to the next stage of defining and selecting potential explanatory variables to
be used to accurately detect accounting fraud offences. In particular, financial ratios
will be proposed as explanatory variables of accounting fraud and further assessed in
terms of detection power.
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Financial Ratio Analysis
It is inspiring to witness all the great work researchers have done by virtue of
accounting fraud detection, not just in terms of statistical analysis and modelling,
but also in regards to the input variables used as predictors of fraudulent reporting.
Nevertheless, there is no consensus on which data features are best for detecting
corporate wrongdoing, probably due to the subjective nature of financial reporting
and the always-evolving dynamic of this type of crime.
Although the use of analytical procedures has certainly increased the effectiveness of
accounting fraud detection (Section 2.7), the analysis of more meaningful information
would undeniably help to achieve more accurate results. It is reasonable to think
that changes in aggregate cycles or the relationship between different financial items
will have a greater explanatory power as opposed to individual account information
(Choi and Green, 1997). Hence, it is generally believed that financial ratio data is more
effective than accounting data, especially when noticing that it leads to noticeably
better results and predictions (Wang, 2010).
A ratio expresses two values or measurements relative to each other, and it is a very
convenient figure since it facilitates the comparison between the two quantities of
interest. One of the advantages of using this kind of calculation is the straightforward
interpretation of a ratio, that is indeed, the number of times that the numerator
contains or is contained within the denominator.
That being said, and taking into account the overwhelming amount of information
contained in financial reports, then a smart selection of relevant financial ratios
is required, considering accounting items that may be more susceptible of being
manipulated and that properly identify key aspects of a firm.
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First, financial ratios will be defined and justified in accordance of literature
popularity, as well as the expected relationship between them and the target variable
Fraud. Then, an exhaustive analysis of financial ratios will be performed employing
the entire collected database, regardless of the economic sector the company belongs
to. At last, a more thorough examination will be conducted by industry to further
explore whether there are different domain-specific accounting tricks executives tend
to use to commit fraud.
In order to construct useful financial ratios and properly analyse them, financial
statement information of public U.S. companies will be used (Chapter 2). The
transformation of the financial data into valuable ratio information is conducted in
the following section, as well as an in-depth analysis of the most relevant ones in
terms of explanatory capability.
4.1 Financial Ratios
As mentioned before, a great deal of research studies includes subjective judgment
and/or qualitative and non-public information into their models, that are only
available to auditors and insiders of the sampled firms. Accounting data, on the other
hand, is publicly available for external interested parties, hence whether it can be used
to detect falsified reporting is an intriguing question (Persons, 1995).
The literature suggests that financial statement information is useful for accounting
fraud detection. In particular, it can be seen that ratio analysis is very popular
for this end suggesting that a careful reading of financial ratios can reasonably
expose symptoms of fraudulent behaviour. As such, ratios are calculated to quantify
the relation between two financial items and to subsequently define acceptable
non-fraudulent values. Therefore, if a fraudulent activity is taking place, financial
ratios associated with manipulated accounts will deviate from the normal behaviour
and conveniently exhibit signs of accounting fraud.
Although the usefulness of financial ratios has been recognised by many researchers
along the years, they also exhibit problems related to near-zero denominators and
dissimilar signs of numerators and denominators. When facing this kind of issues, the
obvious and most tempting option is to delete the particular observation or company
from the analysis, which has been previously done in Section 3.4.4 that deals with the
data validation process.
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There has been an interesting debate (Section 2.7) about which features should be used
for detecting falsified reports, but still no agreement on which ones are best for this
end. An in-depth analysis of the most severe accounting scandals occurred in the U.S.
in the last few decades (Shilit and Perler, 2010) shows that the most frequent tricks
managers employ in order to hide debilitated businesses are commonly associated
with the manipulation of earnings and cash flow items.
In this manner, and considering relevant and significant variables resulting from prior
research work on the topic, this study identifies 20 financial statement ratios that
measure the majority of aspects of a firm’s financial performance, including leverage,
profitability, liquidity and efficiency. All financial ratios are computed using the
selected financial items previously described in Section 3.2.
Leverage
One of the most important aspects of a firm is leverage, since it represents the potential
return of an investment based on the debt structure of the company. When debt is
used to purchase assets then the value of assets exceeds the borrowing cost, basically
because debt interest is tax deductible. However, this practice comes with greater
risks for investors, considering that sometimes firms are not able to pay their debt
obligations.
In consequence, companies having trouble paying their debts may be tempted to
manipulate financial statements in order to meet debt covenants. Therefore, high
levels of debt should increase the likelihood of accounting fraud, since it transfers
the risk from the firm and its managers to shareholders.
Many studies have measured this aspect using the following financial ratios:
• Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA): It has been shown that debt size compare
to the total value of a company is a significant metric to assess accounting fraud,
since the higher this proportion is, then less risk is taken by the equity owners
and managers and more risk is shifted to investors (Persons, 1995; Spathis, 2002;
Spathis, Doumpos, and Zopounidis, 2002; Kaminski, Wetzel, and Guan, 2004;
Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Lenard, Watkins, and Alam, 2007; Pai, Hsu, and Wang,
2011; Song et al., 2014). Therefore, it is expected to find higher levels of leverage
in fraudulent firms than non-fraudulent and, in consequence, a positive relation
between TLTA and fraud.
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• Total Liabilities to Total Equity (TLTE): As before, a positive association is
expected between TLTE and fraud, as managers may be tempted to increase
debt in order to reduce the risk of equity owners when facing difficult times.
The inclusion of this variable seems reasonable considering the evidence of its
power to detect accounting fraud (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Kirkos, Spathis,
and Manolopoulos, 2007; Dalnial et al., 2014).
• Long-Term Debt to Total Assets (LTDTA): It has been suggested that since the
estimation of accounts related to long-term obligations is subjective, then it is
easier to manipulate them (Kirkos, Spathis, and Manolopoulos, 2007; Pai, Hsu,
and Wang, 2011). Consequently, the more difficult is to detect falsified long-term
items and the more attractive is to commit fraud using these accounts. Again,
it is expected to find higher levels of LTDTA in fraudulent firms compared to
non-fraudulent firms.
Profitability
Profitability measures are used to estimate a firm’s ability to generate earnings
compared to its costs, hence the importance of maintaining these metrics in line
with market projections. As consequence, executives may be willing to manipulate
earnings-related financial statements in order to cover profitability problems when
companies are not performing as expected.
To test whether firms with poorer financial condition are more likely to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting, relevant ratios associated with income, expenses and
retained earnings will be considered and accordingly, define below.
• Net Income to Total Assets (NITA): Many studies have exposed the utility of
using NITA as an explanatory variable of accounting fraud (Persons, 1995;
Spathis, 2002; Spathis, Doumpos, and Zopounidis, 2002; Kaminski, Wetzel, and
Guan, 2004; Kirkos, Spathis, and Manolopoulos, 2007; Lenard, Watkins, and
Alam, 2007; Ravisankar et al., 2011; Pai, Hsu, and Wang, 2011; Gupta and Gill,
2012; Dalnial et al., 2014; Song et al., 2014). The rationale behind the use of this
ratio is that when profit projections are not met, then overstating revenue or
understating expenses may be a practical solution. In consequence, it would not
be surprising to see unusually high levels of income compare to the size of the
business, i.e.: total assets, when it comes to fraudulent companies.
45
Chapter 4. Financial Ratio Analysis
• Retained Earnings to Total Assets (RETA): Retained earnings make direct
reference to accumulated profit, so similarly to the previous ratio, a
positive relation is expected between RETA and fraud occurrence considering
management temptation of maliciously exaggerate these records in order to
please shareholders. Prior research work support this theory as it can be seen
in Lee, Ingram, and Howard (1999), Kaminski, Wetzel, and Guan (2004), and
Gupta and Gill (2012).
• Earnings Before Interest and Tax to Total Assets (EBITTA): EBIT, also referred
as operating income, is one of the most important indicators of a company’s
profitability and, consequently, very likely to be modified to further hide
mediocre performance. It is believed that fraudulent firms are prone to
improperly magnify this particular financial item when needed, hence the
usefulness of comparing this metric to total assets as predictor of accounting
fraud (Kotsiantis et al., 2006).
Liquidity
Liquidity refers to the ability to which an asset can be converted from an investment
to cash. This concept is highly important for businesses and investors, since liquid
assets reduce in some extent investing risks by ensuring the capacity of a firm to pay
off debts as they come due. Consequently, problems involving liquidity may provide
an incentive for managers to commit accounting fraud, hence the need to investigate
financial ratios related to the liquid composition of assets, as is the case of working
capital and current assets.
• Working Capital to Total Assets (WCTA): By far, one of most popular liquidity
ratios used to predict accounting fraud probably because of its importance
for shareholders (Spathis, 2002; Spathis, Doumpos, and Zopounidis, 2002;
Kaminski, Wetzel, and Guan, 2004; Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Kirkos, Spathis, and
Manolopoulos, 2007; Pai, Hsu, and Wang, 2011). As define in Section 3.1,
working capital is the difference between current assets and current liabilities,
representing the capital needed by a company to successfully perform its daily
operations. Lower liquidity will encourage executives to inflate current assets
and eventually overstate working capital, then fraudulent firms should show
higher values for WCTA.
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• Current Assets to Total Assets (CATA): Some studies have used current assets
directly (Persons, 1995; Lenard, Watkins, and Alam, 2007) based on the claim
that the higher this value as a proportion of total assets, the more likely is that
a company is committing accounting fraud. Hence, a positive association with
this ratio is expected.
• Current Assets to Current Liabilities (CACL): Also known as current ratio, this
metric is mainly used to determine company’s financial health, since it measures
the ability to pay short-term debt and other payables, i.e.: current liabilities.
Acceptable values of CACL vary depending on the industry, but it is believed
that dishonest firms will tend to exaggerate this ratio as much as possible
to ultimately project a favourable economic position (Kotsiantis et al., 2006;
Lenard, Watkins, and Alam, 2007; Ravisankar et al., 2011; Song et al., 2014).
• Cash to Net Income (CHNI): A very important component of current assets is
cash as it represents the company’s most immediate instrument of exchange.
Alteration of this item is somewhat difficult due to its tangible nature, hence
increase in net income and not in cash may be an indicator of accounting fraud.
Therefore, lower values of CHNI are expected in presence of irregular activities.
Many investors have alternatively focused their attention on the company’s capability
to generate cash from its actual business operations. This aspect however, is usually
manipulated since "companies can exert a great deal of discretion when presenting
cash flows" (Shilit and Perler, 2010). Ergo, the importance of thoroughly analyse
cash flow from operations and, in particular, evaluate its relationship with reported
earnings.
• Cash Flow From Operations to Net Income (CFFONI): Cash flow from
operations and net income are valid metrics of businesses’ performance, hence
the expectation of both moving in the same direction, that is, systematic change
in one of them shall be accompanied by a similar change in the other. Therefore,
disparities between these items should be taken seriously, as it may indicate that
accounting fraud is being perpetrated. Fraudulent firms may try to increase
earnings but fail to boost CFFO levels, so lower values of this ratio are expected
in these instances.
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Efficiency
Financial efficiency refers to the capacity of producing as much as possible using as
few resources as possible. Inefficiency usually involves higher costs, hence resulting
in poorer firm’s performance, which may motivate managers to misstate financial
statements that allow subjective estimations, and therefore, are easier to manipulate.
Such is the case of accounts receivable, accounts payable, inventory and cost of good
sold, so financial ratios related to these accounts are further selected.
• Accounts Receivable to Total Sales (RVSA): There is strong evidence of the
significance of this ratio when detecting accounting fraud (Fanning and Cogger,
1998; Feroz et al., 2000; Kaminski, Wetzel, and Guan, 2004; Pai, Hsu, and Wang,
2011). Many cases of dishonest reporting involve the inflation of current-period
earnings through the incorrect early recognition of revenue or the recognition
of fictitious earnings (Shilit and Perler, 2010). A clear sign of these strategies is
when accounts receivable grow much faster than sales, hence the need to assess
the relationship between these two variables and be careful when this ratio is
smaller than usual.
• Accounts Receivable to Total Assets (RVTA): Accounts receivable are also a
component of current assets (CA), along with cash and inventories. Thereby,
in order to artificially increase CA, managers may be tempted to exaggerate
receivables, in particular considering how difficulty is to audit this kind
of transactions. Then, a positive relation is expected as fraudulent firms
should have higher levels of accounts receivable compare to total assets than
non-fraudulent firms (Lin, Hwang, and Becker, 2003; Kaminski, Wetzel, and
Guan, 2004; Kotsiantis et al., 2006).
• Inventory to Total Sales (IVSA): It is believed that weakened companies usually
have lower stock turnover with respect to sales (Fanning and Cogger, 1998;
Spathis, 2002; Spathis, Doumpos, and Zopounidis, 2002; Pai, Hsu, and Wang,
2011). Large inventories may make the firm more vulnerable to accounting
fraud, so a positive relation is expected between IVSA and fraud occurrence.
• Inventory to Total Assets (IVTA): Research findings suggest that fraudulent
companies tend to maliciously overstate inventories to boost current assets
(CA) and ultimately hide business deterioration (Ravisankar et al., 2011; Gupta
and Gill, 2012; Dalnial et al., 2014; Song et al., 2014). Legitimate increase in
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inventories should be naturally followed by an increment in total assets, hence
high values of IVTA should be taken seriously, as it may be an indicator of
dishonest valuation of inventories.
• Inventory to Current Assets (IVCA): Again, higher levels of inventories directly
compare to current assets may be suggesting improper financial estimates of
inventory (Ravisankar et al., 2011)
• Inventory to Cost of Good Sold (IVCOGS): Typically, converting inventory into
expense happens immediately after a sale has occurred. Nevertheless, in some
cases it is not such a straightforward process, and unethical managers may
be temped to take advantage of this situation and intentionally fail to record
necessary expenses for excess and obsolete inventory. This could potentially
lead to artificial high values of inventory in addition to low values of cost of
good sold. For this reason, it is expected that fraudulent firms show higher
values of IVCOGS compared to non-fraudulent businesses (Kaminski, Wetzel,
and Guan, 2004; Ravisankar et al., 2011; Song et al., 2014).
• Accounts Payable to Cost of Good Sold (PYCOGS): A common technique used
to commit accounting fraud is the increment of operating cash flow through
unsustainable activities, in particular, boosting CFFO by artificially decreasing
outstanding accounts (Shilit and Perler, 2010). In particular, the ratio of payables
to cost of good sold describes how much the company has as pending payments
in terms of operating expenses, so lower values of PYCOGS may be the result
of the aforementioned technique, and in consequence, a clear sign of accounting
fraud.
Efficiency it also linked to capital turnover, which represents the sales generating
power of a firm’s assets. In order to maintain the appearance of consistent growth,
fraudulent managers may be tempted to manipulate sale-related financial items when
dealing with competitive situations. Accordingly, the following two sale-ratios are
considered in order to identify possible fictitious trend in growth.
• Total Sales to Total Assets (SATA): Unjustified jumps in revenue that are
not in harmony with the size of the company (i.e.: total assets) should be
always taken in consideration when examining financial reports since it is often
related to accounting fraud (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Spathis, Doumpos, and
Zopounidis, 2002; Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Kirkos, Spathis, and Manolopoulos,
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2007; Lenard, Watkins, and Alam, 2007). Therefore, a positive association
between SATA and fraud occurrence is awaited.
• Total Sales to Total Equity (SATE): Similarly, increments in revenue but not in
shareholders’ equity is rather suspicious considering that both items should
move together in the same direction. Hence the need to evaluate this ratio to
look for accounting fraud symptoms.
A detailed analysis of the aforementioned ratios will be performed next to evaluate
the best explanatory variables of accounting fraud and the relationship between
each other and also in regards to the target variable, Fraud. But first, detection and
treatment of extreme values has to be done to remove uninformative observations that
may distort the analysis and further modelling of the studied fraudulent behaviour.
TABLE 4.1: Summary of considered financial ratios and calculation
Category Financial Ratio Calculation
TLTA Total Liabilities / Total Assets
Leverage TLTE Total Liabilities / Total Equity
LTDTA Long-Term Debt / Total Assets
NITA Net Income / Total Assets
Profitability RETA Retained Earnings / Total Assets
EBITTA Earning Before Interest and Tax / Total Assets
WCTA Working Capital / Total Assets
CATA Current Assets / Total Assets
Liquidity CACL Current Assets / Current Liabilities
CHNI Cash / Net Income
CFFONI Cash Flow From Operations / Net Income
RVSA Accounts Receivable / Total Sales
RVTA Accounts Receivable / Total Assets
IVSA Inventory / Total Sales
Efficiency IVTA Inventory / Total Assets
IVCA Inventory / Current Assets
IVCOGS Inventory / Cost of Good Sold
PYCOGS Accounts Payable / Cost of Good Sold
SATA Total Sales / Total Assets
SATE Total Sales / Total Equity
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4.2 Outlier Detection
Outliers or extreme observations are values that are very distant from other
observations, or in simple words, that are unusually small or large compared to the
rest of the dataset. There are two types of outliers, the ones that occur by chance and
are considered to be valid, and the ones that result from measurement or recording
errors typically considered as invalid observations. Regardless of whether they are
valid or not, it is imperative to understand how they may affect the analysis, in
particular when financial ratios are being evaluated.
As mentioned above, financial ratios are very useful when comparing two numerical
values, but suffer from a significant disadvantage. Given that ratios are fractions,
then zero denominators or values close to zero may result in undefined expressions
or extremely large values, leading to meaningless comparisons between the studied
financial items. In these cases, outliers may be very influential and potentially
cause important distortions in terms of descriptive statistics, inferential analysis and
statistical modelling. Hence the importance of carefully locate them and later extract
them using an appropriate analytical approach.
In general, there are two ways of dealing with outliers. The first approach uses basic
descriptive statistics and useful visual mechanisms to detect extreme observations,
such as minimum and maximum values, means and variances, as well as histograms,
boxplots and scatterplots.
The second approach instead, locates outliers calculating how far the observations
are from the centre, that is, how many standard deviations each data value lies away
from the mean. For this end, z-scores are calculated for all the observations using the
following formula:
Z =
X − X¯
S
(4.1)
where X represents the data value, X¯ is the sample mean and S the sample standard
deviation.
It is commonly accepted that if an observation is situated three standards deviations
away from the mean, then is considered as an outlier. Or in other words, if the
absolute value of its z-score is bigger than three. This method is finally adopted in
order to detect and remove extreme values present in the database.
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4.3 Ratio Analysis
In order to perform a comprehensive analysis of the selected financial ratios
previously defined, a summary of them is presented in Table 4.8, along with the
involved mathematical calculation and the expected relationship with regard to
accounting fraud.
TABLE 4.2: Summary of selected financial ratios and expected relation
with target variable Fraud
Financial Ratios Expected Relationship
TLTA Positive
TLTE Positive
LTDTA Positive
NITA Positive
RETA Positive
EBITTA Positive
WCTA Positive
CATA Positive
CACL Positive
CHNI Negative
CFFONI Negative
RVSA Negative
RVTA Positive
IVSA Positive
IVTA Positive
IVCA Positive
IVCOGS Positive
PYCOGS Negative
SATA Positive
SATE Positive
To evaluate significant differences between financial accounts related to fraudulent
and genuine reports, two hypothesis testing techniques will be described and
implemented next. First, a parametric approach will be performed to test differences
in the average values of financial ratios of fraud and non-fraud firms. Then, a
non-parametric method will be implemented to test if the distribution of fraudulent
data differs significantly compared to non-fraudulent data.
52
Chapter 4. Financial Ratio Analysis
Two Sample t-test
A simple yet very informative univariate analysis is performed as a first step to
understand key financial indicators that may be suggesting that accounting fraud has
been or is being committed. In particular, t-tests are conducted to assess whether the
examined financial ratio has the same mean within the two groups, that is, non-fraud
and fraud firms. Therefore, the following hypotheses are specified:
H0 : µ1 = µ2
H1 : µ1 6= µ2
(4.2)
where the subscript 1 makes reference to non-fraud firms and the subscript 2 makes
reference to fraud firms.
It can be observed (Table 4.3) that sample standard deviations of both groups are
reasonably dissimilar for all selected financial ratios. Therefore, it will be assumed that
both populations, non-fraud and fraud, have unequal variances and, consequently,
the following formula for the t-statistic corresponding to the hypothesis testing
specified above will be considered:
t =
X¯1 − X¯2√√√√√√
 s21
n1
+
s22
n2

(4.3)
where X¯ represents the sample mean, s2 is the sample variance and n is the sample
size. Again, subscript 1 makes reference to non-fraudulent firms and subscript 2 to
fraudulent companies.
The resulting statistic is distributed as Student’s t with ν degrees of freedom, where ν
is given by:
ν =
(
s21
n1
+
s22
n2
)2
(
s21
n1
)2
n1 − 1 +
(
s22
n2
)2
n2 − 1
(4.4)
After the test has been performed, the p-value associated with the corresponding
statistic can be easily calculated as the probability of obtaining a result equal to
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or more extreme than the one obtained from the sample considering that the null
hypothesis is true. If this probability is low, then it is very unlikely that a value as
extreme as the one obtained from the sample is observed, hence it seems suspicious
that the null hypothesis is true. Accordingly, if p-value is lower than the significance
level1, then the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected so the evidence favours the
alternative, H1. Therefore, it can be said that there is a significant difference between
the non-fraudulent firms and fraudulent firms.
Moreover, when saying that there is a significant difference between the groups, it
means that the analysed financial ratio has the power to explain in some degree
the variable of interest, that is, the target variable Fraud. Hence it can be used as
meaningful information for accounting fraud detection. If the financial ratio is not
significant, it will not contribute much to the analysis and, in consequence, it makes
no sense to include it as a predictive variable.
It is worth mentioning the importance of interpretability when adopting statistical
techniques for detecting accounting fraud. In addition to the tests that will be
performed next, the expectation of the relation between the studied ratios and the
target variable will also be analysed, as it is a very straightforward task just by
inspecting which group, non-fraud or fraud, shows a larger mean. It is hereby
highly preferable to meet what was anticipated by business experts and researchers,
otherwise potential users will be reluctant to use the proposed methodology.
Results of the proposed 20 tests are shown in Table 4.3. All relevant information of
the testing approach is presented, including sample mean, sample standard deviation
and sample size of both groups, as well as the resulting t-statistics, degrees of freedom
and p-values for all selected financial ratios.
An exhaustive analysis of these results will be performed next, examining whether
the included financial ratios are statistically significant and in accordance with the
expectations described before.
1A significance level of 0.05 will be considered for this test.
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1. TLTA: There is virtually no difference between non-fraud and fraud firms, hence
no apparent contribution from this financial ratio.
2. TLTE: The p-value of this ratio suggests a significant effect on the target variable
Fraud, and sample means are in agreement with the expectation, that is,
fraudulent firms show higher levels of liabilities compared to shareholders’
equity than non-fraudulent companies.
3. LTDTA: Slightly higher mean for the fraudulent group, as expected, but not
statistically significant.
4. NITA: Lower, and negative, mean of net income to total assets for fraud firms,
which is contradictory to the expected. Not significant explanatory variable,
whatsoever.
5. RETA: Important discrepancy between the average of both groups (Figure 4.1a),
higher for fraudulent companies as expected.
6. EBITTA: Significant higher levels of EBIT compared to total assets can
be observed for fraudulent companies (Figure 4.1b), suggesting managers’
preference for manipulating earnings figures.
7. WCTA: The higher the value of working capital compared to total assets, the
higher the likelihood of committing accounting fraud.
8. CATA: A highly significant positive influence of this financial ratio is suggested
by the p-value, which is in harmony with prior expectation.
9. CACL: It can be seen from Figure 4.1c that fraudulent firms present significantly
lower levels of CACL compared to non-fraudulent companies, which is
contradictory to what was expected.
10. CHNI: The expectation of lower values of cash compared to net income for
dishonest firms is supported by Figure 4.1d, although not in a significant way.
11. CFFONI: Lower levels of CFFO to net income can be observed for the fraudulent
group as expected, but not significant enough.
12. RVSA: As it can be seen in Figure 4.1e, fraudulent firms have, on average,
lower values of RVSA compared to non-fraudulent companies. This result is
statistically significant and in accordance to what was expected.
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13. RVTA: There is no clear difference between non-fraud and fraud firms in terms
of RVTA, thus no significant contribution made by this ratio.
14. IVSA: Virtually no difference between groups, hence not significant predictor.
15. IVTA: Significantly higher values of IVTA within fraudulent firms, supporting
the suspicion of artificially exaggerate inventory levels as a means to commit
accounting fraud.
16. IVCA: Same as before, and as expected, significantly higher levels of inventory
to current assets is found in fraud cases.
17. IVCOGS: The higher this financial ratio, the more likely it is that a company is
committing fraud. Significant result when one-tailed test is considered.
18. PYCOGS: Significantly lower levels of accounts payable compare to cost of good
sold were found for fraudulent firms, as expected (Figure 4.1f).
19. SATA: In accordance with the expectation, a significant positive effect of this
financial ratio is suggested when one-side test is considered.
20. SATE: Slightly higher mean for the fraudulent group, as expected, but not
statistically significant.
Mann-Whitney test
An alternative hypothesis testing technique is proposed as t-test may be suffering
from important drawbacks. The so-called Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric
method that is commonly employed due to its ease of use and availability in several
advanced statistical software.
In simple terms, non-parametric methods refer to statistical techniques that do not
make assumptions on the data distribution, hence the reason they are also called
distribution-free tests (Hollander, Wolfe, and Chicken, 2013). These models are
particularly useful when there are definite outliers or extreme observations in the
data, as is the case of the studied database.
The Mann-Whitney test is performed using the rank of the data, that is, the position of
each observation within the sample rather than the value per se. In light of this, then
it is easy to notice that outliers will have a minimal effect on the test, which makes it
very robust in terms of extreme values (Sheskin, 2003).
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(A) RETA (B) EBITTA
(C) CACL (D) CHNI
(E) RVSA (F) PYCOGS
FIGURE 4.1: Boxplots of Significant Financial Ratios for Non-fraud
and Fraud Firms
58
Chapter 4. Financial Ratio Analysis
The test procedure starts calculating the rank of every data point in each sample, fraud
and non-fraud firms. Ranks are ordered first within the first group (fraud firms) and
then within the second (non-fraud firms), and compared later using a test statistic
that measures the number of ranking discrepancy between both groups. If groups are
similar, ranks will look alike and, in consequence, the distribution of the data for both
samples should be equivalent. On the contrary, if groups are dissimilar, then ranks
will differ, which suggests different distribution across the groups.
The following hypotheses are specified for the Mann-Whitney test:
H0 : the distribution of both groups are equal
H1 : the distribution of both groups are not equal
(4.5)
Same as t-tests, the test statistic and p-value are calculated for all financial ratios.
Accordingly, if p-value is lower than the significance level2, then the null hypothesis
H0 can be rejected so the evidence favours the alternative,H1. Therefore, it can be said
that there is a significant difference between the non-fraudulent firms and fraudulent
firms with regard to the financial ratio of interest.
Results of the 20 Mann-Whitney tests are shown in the table below:
TABLE 4.4: Two-sample Mann-Whitney test
Ratios statistic* p-value
TLTA -1.979 0.0479
TLTE -3.952 0.0001
LTDTA -4.789 0.0000
NITA -1.382 0.1669
RETA -4.067 0.0000
EBITTA -5.858 0.0000
WCTA -3.575 0.0004
CATA -3.961 0.0001
CACL -1.979 0.0479
CHNI -1.185 0.2360
CFFONI 4.280 0.0000
RVSA -4.242 0.0000
RVTA -6.640 0.0000
IVSA -6.405 0.0000
IVTA -7.740 0.0000
IVCA -3.907 0.0001
IVCOGS -7.281 0.0000
PYCOGS -1.858 0.0632
SATA -6.113 0.0000
SATE -8.198 0.0000
2Again, a significance level of 0.05 will be considered for this test.
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It is interesting to see that almost all ratios show p-values lower than 0.05, which
suggests significant differences between both fraud and non-fraud firms. However,
two insignificant ratios are revealed when conducting non-parametric tests, that
is, NITA and CHNI. As such, it is decided to exclude them from more advanced
statistical modelling due to their poor detection power.
4.4 Ratio Analysis by Industry
The univariate exploration previously conducted, clearly exposed potential
associations between the selected financial ratios and the target variable, Fraud. As
a result of the performed tests, 13 out of the twenty ratios initially considered, were
found to be significant, which represents a great first step to further reduce the
number of explanatory variables. Nevertheless, assuming that fraudsters behave
the same across all sectors is fairly naive, so a more elaborated domain-specific
examination is reasonably required. Actually, it soon will be seen that when extending
the analysis by industry, interesting patterns emerge from the data.
4.4.1 Standard Industrial Classification Overview
Before performing the proposed industry-specific analysis and modelling, a brief
explanation of the different industries is given next, along with a detailed description
of subsectors involved in each category.
SIC codes are four-digit numerical representations of major businesses and industries.
These codes are assigned based on common characteristics shared in the products,
services, production and delivery system of a business or organisation.
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing: subdivisions within this industry include
agricultural production of crops, livestock and animal specialties, agricultural
services, forestry services, fishing, hunting and trapping.
2. Mining and Construction: subdivisions within the mining industry include
metal and ores mining, mining of nonmetallic minerals, petroleum, drilling oil,
and gas exploration and services. The manufacturing industry includes general
and heavy construction, building contractors and electrical work, among others.
3. Manufacturing: subdivisions within the manufacturing industry include food
products and plants, dairy products, fruits, vegetables, food specialities, canned
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food, grain and bakery products, sugar products, fats and oils, beverages,
tobacco products, mill products, products of fabrics and similar materials,
clothing, textile products, wood products and furnitures, papers and allied
products, newspapers, books and miscellaneous publishing, chemicals and
allied products, plastic materials, pharmaceutical preparations, detergents and
cleaning products, cosmetics and sanitation preparations, leather products,
glass and stone products, electrical equipment, structural metal products,
engine and machinery, electronic, components, computers and devices, motor
vehicles and equipment, optical instruments and lenses, surgical and medical
instruments and supplies, jewellery, musical instrument, games and toys, and
sporting and athletic goods, among others.
4. Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service:
subdivisions within this industry include local and suburban transit, passenger
transportation, trucking and courier services, water and air transportation,
transportation services, radio, telephone and telegraph communications, radio
and television broadcasting and services, electric, gas and sanitary services
transmission and distribution, and water supply, among others.
5. Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade: subdivisions within this industry include
wholesale goods, supplies, furniture, materials, equipment, hardware and
software, retail supply and dealers, department stores, grocery and convenience
stores, gasoline stations, clothing and shoe stores, consumer electronic stores,
and eating and drinking places, among others.
6. Financial, Insurance and Real Estate: subdivisions within the financial industry
include national and state commercial banks, saving institutions, deposit
banking, credit agencies and institutions, loan and security brokers, and
investment advice. The insurance industry includes life insurance, accident
and health insurance, hospital and medical service, fire and casualty insurance,
and insurance agents, brokers and service. The real estate industry include real
estate operators and lessors, operators of buildings, real estate agents, managers
and dealers, land developers, real estate investment trusts, and investors,
among others.
7. Services: subdivisions within this industry include hotels and motels,
advertising agencies and services, services to dwellings and other buildings,
equipment services, employment agencies, computer programming and data
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processing services, business services, automotive repair, service and parking,
auto rental and leasing, picture and video production, distribution and rental,
gambling transactions, amusement parks, sports and recreational clubs, health
services and hospitals, medical laboratories, legal services, educational services,
social services, engineering, accounting, research and management services, and
consulting services among others.
8. Public Administration: this last sector consists of establishments of federal,
state and local government agencies that administer, oversee and manage
public programs and have executive, legislative or judicial authority over other
institutions within a given area.
4.4.2 Analysis by Industry
Twenty t-tests are performed in what follows, one per selected financial ratio, but now
considering the sector where sampled companies belong to. Table 4.3 summarises
significant predictors and the relationship with the dependent variable for each
individual SIC industry. Mann-Whitney tests were also implemented, but it has been
decided to omit results mainly due to the similarity with t-test results and to avoid
overwhelming the reader with repetitive information.
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing: Only four financial ratios were found to be
significant in this case. In particular, fraudulent firms belonging to this industry
will most probably exhibit higher values of EBITTA, and lower values of CACL,
IVSA and PYCOGS when compared to non-fraudulent companies.
2. Mining and Construction: Interestingly, fraud companies within this sector are
much more aggressive in terms of accounting tricks. It can be seen that 14 out
of the initial 20, are very likely to be manipulated. Most of them, including
TLTA, TLTE, LTDTA, RETA, EBITTA, RVTA, IVSA, IVTA, IVCA, IVCOGS, SATA
and SATE, show higher average values compared to non-fraudulent figures, and
lower values when dealing with CACL, RVSA and PYCOGS. It is noticeable
how do these companies exaggerate debt obligations, inventory levels and sales
in such an obvious way to further distort their financial reports.
3. Manufacturing: Numerous gimmicks are also accomplished by deceptive
manufacturing companies in order to commit accounting fraud. Some evident
indicators of falsified reports in this case include lower values of TLTA, NITA,
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RETA, CATA, CACL, CFFONI and RVSA, as well as higher levels of TLTE,
EBITTA and IVCA.
4. Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service: Most of
the manipulated accounts in this industry are associated with the reduction of
inventories and sales figures, as well as the exaggeration of earnings. As such, it
can be seen lower values of IVSA, IVTA, IVCA, PYCOGS and SATA, and higher
values of RETA, again when compared to genuine reports.
5. Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade: It seems that the modus operandi related to
deceptive wholesale and retail traders are connected to artificially increasing
retained earnings, current assets and inventory since higher levels of RETA,
CATA, IVSA and IVTA are apparent for such deceptive companies.
6. Financial, Insurance and Real Estate: In this case, a careful analysis of the
selected ratios has to be done considering that several financial items are not
available for banks, such as current assets, current liabilities and working
capital, among others. That being said, clear signs of accounting fraud can be
identified such as higher values of TLTA, TLTE, LTDTA, RETA and IVCOGS,
and lower quantities regarding CHNI, RVSA, PYCOGS and SATA.
7. Services: Curiously, fraudulent firms in this industry tend to falsified records
through the reduction of inventory, accounts payable and sales, and via the
exaggeration of earnings. As such, companies committing fraud are likely to
present lower values of IVTA, IVA, IVCOGS, PYCOGS, SATA, RVSA and CATA,
as well as higher values of RETA and EBITTA.
8. Public Administration: In contrast with the previous industry, the Public
Administration sector tends to artificially inflate inventory and earnings figures
in order to falsify their financial reports. Consequently, fraudulent firms in
this industry reveal higher average values of IVSA, IVTA, IVCA, IVCOGS,
RETA and EBITTA. It is worth mentioning as well, that higher levels of LTDTA
and lower levels of WCTA, CATA and SATA are expected to be shown when
accounting fraud is being committed by firms belonging to this domain.
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There are interesting differences between sectors as some ratios are significant or not
depending on the industry the company belongs to. A more detailed analysis and
interpretation of these and more results is performed in Chapter 5.
In addition to the ratio analysis previously conducted, an exploration of possible
association between the explanatory variables will be performed in order to identify
the most relevant financial ratios for detecting accounting fraud.
4.5 Correlation Analysis
A very popular technique, often applied in data analytics, is correlation analysis. This
method is used to evaluate possible relationships between numerical variables, which
is particularly useful when working with accounting items that inevitably interact
with each other due to the composition of a financial statement report.
The correlation coefficient quantifies the direction and strength of the implicit
relationship of two variables of interest, and only expresses the association between
them, not the causality. Nonetheless, if correlation is found between two variables,
then it can be used as an indicator of a potential casual relation.
Correlated features should simultaneously change in accordance to the sign of their
relationship. Positive correlations will exist if systematic increase in one variable is
followed by an increase in the other. Similarly, negative correlations occur when the
increase in one variable leads to the decrease of the other. Additionally, the magnitude
of the correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the association. The larger the
value, the stronger is the association.
Two different measures of correlation will be used to analyse the relationship between
the financial ratios of interest. First, Pearson correlation will be calculated assuming a
linear relationship between the ratios, and then Kendall correlations will be computed
making no linearity assumption whatsoever.
4.5.1 Pearson Correlation
As a first step, Pearson correlation coefficients will be used to explore possible linear
relationship between the explanatory variables. Pearson coefficients always range
between +1 and −1, and they can be calculated using the following formula:
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r =
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
√∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)2
(4.6)
where x and y are the variables of interest, n is the sample size, and x¯ and y¯ the
correspondent sample means.
The aforementioned coefficient suggests a strong positive correlation if the value is
close to +1, a strong negative correlation if close to −1 and a weak correlation when
close to 0. It is important to note that there may be non-linear associations present in
the data, but this particular coefficient does not detect such relationships.
The resulting correlation matrix is presented below (Figure 4.2), summarising the
correlation coefficients between all financial ratios. A friendly coloured legend is
utilised to facilitate visualisation, where red boxes suggest positive linear associations
and blue boxes suggest negative linear relations.
FIGURE 4.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix
In order to achieve a better understanding of the magnitude of the linear relation
between the financial ratios of interest, a summary of the most relevant Pearson
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correlation coefficients3 is presented in Table 4.6.
TABLE 4.6: Most relevant Pearson correlation coefficients
Financial Ratios Correlation Coefficient
IVTA IVCA 0.8723
TLTA WCTA -0.7215
TLTE SATE 0.5597
RETA EBITTA 0.5362
WCTA CATA 0.4997
Some interesting relationships can be observed from the correlation matrix and
summary table. To start with, a strong association between IVTA and IVCA is found.
This is not surprising considering both ratios measure the amount of inventory in
terms of assets, first considering the total value and then the current amount. As
described in Section 3.1, current assets are a component of total assets, so a strong
positive correlation is in fact expected between these two items.
In addition, a strong negative relationship between WCTA and TLTA is clearly evident
and certainly expected. The rationale behind this relationship is fairly simple: total
liabilities is a linear calculation of total assets and total equity (Equation 3.1), and
working capital is calculated as the difference between current assets and current
liabilities. As current assets are an important component of total assets, then a positive
association between WC and TA is expected, as well as a negative association between
TL and TA, assuming total equity remain fixed. Consequently, the expectation of a
negative relation between WC and TL is reasonably justified.
Moderate positive correlations are also exposed between the following ratios: (i) TLTE
and SATE; (ii) RETA and EBITTA; and (iii) WCTA and CATA.
4.5.2 Kendall Correlation
As an alternative approach, Kendall correlation coefficients are calculated next. In
this case, the goal is to assess monotonic relationships, that could be linear or not,
based-on rank similarity (Kendall, 1955). Monotonic relationships occur when one
variable increases as well as the other variable, or when one variable increases and the
other one decreases. The increase/decrease of the analysed variables could happen at
the same rate, which is the case of linear relations, or in a dissimilar proportion, which
is the case of non-linear associations.
3Coefficients that score equal or higher than 0.5 in absolute value.
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The Kendall correlation, also called Kendall rank correlation coefficient or Kendall’s
tau, is the non-parametric version of the Pearson correlation. As discussed in the
previous section (Chapter 4.3), a non-parametric method makes no assumptions on
the distribution of the data, hence the more robust it is when dealing with outliers
and data contamination (Sheskin, 2003).
It is said to be a measure of rank correlation in the sense that it calculates the
relative position of all observations within one variable (rank position), and then
compares them with the ranks obtained within the second variable. If observations
from both variables have a similar rank (concordant observations), then a high
positive correlation will be obtained. Conversely, if ranks are dissimilar (discordant
observations), then negative correlations are expected.
Kendall correlation can be calculated using the Tau-A statistic defined as follows:
τA =
nc − nd
n(n− 1)/2 (4.7)
where nc is the number of concordant pair of observations, nd is the number of
discordant pair of observations, and n is the sample size.
Again, resulting Kendall correlations are summarised in a coloured legend correlation
matrix, where intense red boxes indicate positive relationships, i.e.: increases in one
variable are associated with increases in the other variable, and intense blue boxes
indicate negative associations, that is increases in one variables are aligned with
decreases in the other variable. In addition, a summary of most relevant correlations
is shown in Table 4.7.
TABLE 4.7: Most relevant Kendall correlation coefficients
Financial Ratios Correlation Coefficient
IVSA IVCOGS 0.8693
IVTA IVCA 0.8167
WCTA CACL 0.7732
IVSA IVTA 0.7485
NITA RETA 0.7275
NITA EBITTA 0.7275
TLTA TLTE 0.7145
IVSA IVCA 0.7039
IVCA IVCOGS 0.6523
WCTA CATA 0.5684
SATA SATE 0.5504
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FIGURE 4.3: Kendall Correlation Matrix
Some results are in agreement with Pearson correlations, although additional
interesting relationships are further exposed.
It can be clearly seen that all inventory-related ratios are strongly positive correlated:
IVSA, IVTA, IVCA and IVCOGS. Although this situation is completely expected, it
entails an important issue when implementing regression models. If two or more
variables are highly correlated then multicollinearity emerges, which means some
predictors are redundant. As such, the estimated coefficients of the regression model
may be inaccurate, and therefore, not very reliable. A common practice to remedy this
problem is to reduce the number of variables in order to keep the most informative
ones, procedure that will be implemented at the end of the chapter.
A significant positive association has also been found between CACL and WCTA.
This is not surprising considering that WC is actually the subtraction of CA and CL,
hence a direct relation between these three financial items results from mathematical
construction.
In addition, and as expected, strong positive correlations between ratios related to
profitability have been exposed, which includes both NITA and RETA, as well as
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NITA and EBITTA. Again, multicollinearity problems may arise when including all
these ratios as explanatory variables in a regression model.
A significant positive relation between TLTA and TLTE can also be observed, which
is completely expected since total assets, total liabilities and total equity are all
connected as a result of Equation 3.1.
Finally, moderate positive correlations have been also exposed between the ratios
WCTA and CATA (also found with Pearson’s methodology), as well as between SATA
and SATE. This latter association makes perfect sense as both ratios are related to sales
figures.
4.6 Variable Selection
A comprehensive financial ratio analysis has been conducted to better understand
potential predictors of accounting fraud, in particular, which financial information is
relevant when detecting fraudulent reports and corporate malpractices.
The goal of variable selection is reducing the number of explanatory variables in a
model, as it will make it more concise and fast when classifying a firm as fraud or
non-fraud (Baesens, Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015). Then, is suggested to include only
meaningful and non-redundant predictors to further achieve satisfactory predictive
results.
In what follows, a summary of the removed financial ratios is presented along with
an appropriate explanation of the decision made, supported by results obtained from
the financial ratio analysis performed before.
• NITA: It has been shown that RETA and NITA, as well as RETA and
EBITTA are strongly correlated. In order to simplify the analysis and to
avoid multicollinearity problems, it is decided to include RETA as the only
profitability ratio, mainly because it has shown significant detection power in
both parametric and non-parametric methodologies.
• EBITTA: It has been determined to exclude EBITTA as explanatory variable
using the same argument given before.
• WCTA: This ratio is not statistically significant when analysing accounting fraud
by industry. In addition, it is strongly correlated with several ratios, such
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as TLTA, CACL and CATA, thus it makes no sense to keep it as explanatory
variable.
• CHNI: This financial ratio shows no significant power as predictor of accounting
fraud when implementing both parametric and non-parametric hypothesis
testing, hence the decision of remove it from the analysis.
• RVTA: A strong association between this ratio and RVSA has been found as a
result of the correlation analysis exercise. Previous studies described in Section
2.7 support the usefulness of RVSA as predictor of accounting fraud offences,
hence it is decided to keep it as explanatory variable and, in consequence, to
remove RVTA.
• IVCA: Although it has been shown that this ratio is significant, there is no need
to keep it since it is highly correlated with all other inventory-related ratios,
including IVSA, IVTA and IVCOGS.
• SATE: No significant power was found when implementing the parametric
hypothesis testing. In addition, a strong positive correlation with TLTE has been
exposed, hence the decision of omitting SATE as explanatory variable.
Finally, 13 financial ratios, out of the original 20, will be selected to continue the
analysis of accounting fraud: TLTA, TLTE, LTDTA, RETA, CATA, CACL, CFFONI,
RVSA, IVSA, IVTA, IVCOGS, PYCOGS and SATA.
TABLE 4.8: Summary of selected financial ratios and calculation
Selected Ratio Calculation
TLTA Total Liabilities / Total Assets
TLTE Total Liabilities / Total Equity
LTDTA Long-Term Debt / Total Assets
RETA Retained Earnings / Total Assets
CATA Current Assets / Total Assets
CACL Current Assets / Current Liabilities
CFFONI Cash Flow From Operations / Net Income
RVSA Accounts Receivable / Total Sales
IVSA Inventory / Total Sales
IVTA Inventory / Total Assets
IVCOGS Inventory / Cost of Good Sold
PYCOGS Accounts Payable / Cost of Good Sold
SATA Total Sales / Total Assets
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4.7 Summary
In Chapter 4, a complete analysis of financial ratios has been performed. First, the
use of ratios as explanatory variables of accounting fraud is justified along with
the definition of 20 financial ratios constructed in the basis of financial statements.
Then, two commonly used statistical approaches are proposed to assess significant
differences between corrupted and genuine reports as well as to identify associations
between the considered ratios. Results obtained from hypothesis testing and
correlation analysis support the selection of a smaller subset of explanatory variables
in both scenarios, first omitting economic domains and later considering them as
separate samples.
In the next chapter, a more sophisticated statistical technique will be introduced to
assist the process of variable selection, particularly to help choosing the required
number of predictors needed for achieving satisfactory detection rates. Again, the
analysis will be performed in two stages, first using all observations regardless of
sector-specification, and then considering the industry where firms belong to.
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Complete Subset Logistic
Regression
Most analytical models implemented to detect fraudulent financial reporting start
with numerous variables, out of which only a minority actually contribute to their
classification power (Baesens, Vlasselaer, and Verbeke, 2015). Thereby, a question of
interest to the public is whether fewer explanatory variables can be used in order to
achieve similar accuracy rates as those accomplished when using more predictors.
Classification models can be limited in their performance when a large number of
predictors is considered since computational complexity increases as does the risk of
overfitting. On the one hand, computational costs are higher as more information has
to be analysed, hence the advantage of using only meaningful explanatory variables.
On the other hand, considering too many predictors will most definitely make the
estimation of the models too complicated, which may lead to an overfitting problem
and, subsequently, difficulty of generalising results.
In what follows, an analytical technique is proposed to appropriately tackle the
problem of dimensionality reduction and to further justify the number of explanatory
variables used when modelling accounting fraud. In particular, an extension of the
well-known complete subset regression methodology is implemented using a logistic
regression approach as an alternative to the linear model.
Most variable selection techniques, such as best subset regression, stepwise forward
regression and stepwise backward regression, aim to select the set of predictors that
do the best at meeting some well-defined objective criterion, and then fit a regression
model including all selected predictor variables.
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On the contrary, what is sought in this chapter is to find the optimal number of
variables, which differs to finding the most favourable subset of predictors, as it
will give greater flexibility to choose the desired predictor variables based on expert
knowledge and prior studies inputs.
This new approach is ultimately assessed using not only the traditional accuracy
metrics, but also alternative measurements that are more suitable when dealing with
cost-sensitive environments, such as accounting fraud detection.
5.1 Theoretical Background
A very innovative methodology for combining predictions based on complete subset
regressions is proposed by Elliot, Gargano, and Timmerman (2013). They suggest
this new approach as an alternative to the commonly used forecast methods of ridge
regression, model averaging, bagging and the Lasso.
The subset regression approach is adopted as a way to explore how the number
of included explanatory variables can be used to trade off the bias and variance
of the forecast errors, finding that combinations of subset regressions have the
potential to produce more accurate predictions than the conventional techniques
previously mentioned, as well as more accurate performance compared to simple
linear regression forecasts, which makes this methodology very attractive when
reducing the number of variables is desired.
The complete subset regression procedure takes into account multiple forecasting
results from the combination of all possible regression models to make a final overall
prediction. Accordingly, the number of predictors is fixed, all the regression models
considering the same amount of regressors are run, and then a simple average of the
forecasts from these regressions is calculated for prediction.
In particular, let be K the number of all possible predictors, out of which K unique
simple linear models are directly obtained, as well as nk,K = K!/((K−k)!k!) different
k-variate models when considering that k < K. A complete subset regression is then
defined as the set of all linear regression models for a fixed value of k.
Accordingly, an equal-weighted combination of the forecast from all models within
these subsets is calculated as follow:
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yˆ =
1
K
K∑
i=1
XT βˆi (5.1)
where X is the predictors matrix and βˆi are the estimated regression coefficients.
The complete subset regression estimator is then given by:
βˆk,K =
1
nk,K
nk,K∑
i=1
βˆi (5.2)
5.2 Complete Subset Logistic Regression
The proposed methodology described earlier, clearly shows good accuracy
performance when applied in a setup akin to the efficient frontier of modern portfolio
theory (Elliot, Gargano, and Timmerman, 2013) and when predicting economic affairs
such as unemployment levels, GDP growth and inflation rates (Elliot, Gargano, and
Timmerman, 2015).
Nevertheless, two major problems arise when modelling the binary fraud target using
a linear regression model. On the one hand, the target variable is not normally
distributed but rather follows a Bernoulli distribution with only two values, which
certainly violates the normality assumption required for the application of a linear
model. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the predicted target will be
between 0 and 1, which is an important inconvenience as a binary outcome is desired.
In order to overcome the disadvantages of a linear approach, an alternative
methodology is suggested that extends the aforementioned linear regression models
to logistic regression models. Thereby, the problem description remains the same
except that now a complete subset regression is defined as the set of all logistic
regression models for a fixed value of k.
A logistic regression model is defined by the following bounding function:
σ(z) =
1
1 + exp(−z) (5.3)
One advantage of the logistic function is that for every possible value of z, the
outcome will always be between 0 and 1 (Figure 5.1).
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FIGURE 5.1: Bounding Function for Logistic and Linear Regression
Then, extending the original complete subset regression approach, the forecast for all
combinations of logistic regression will be:
yˆ = σ(XT βˆ) (5.4)
Likewise, the complete subset logistic regression estimator will be given by:
βˆk,K =
1
nk,K
nk,K∑
i=1
βˆi (5.5)
It is worth mentioning that implementing the aforementioned logistic version of the
complete subset regression approach is not the same as averaging the forecasted
logistic functions, i.e.: yˆ = 1nk,K
∑nk,K
i=1 σi(X
T βˆi). This distinction is critically
important as averaging the forecasted estimations is inaccurate when dealing with
non-linear functions such as σi, hence incorrect calculations of accounting fraud
probability are most likely to occur if this formulation is adopted.
To finally decide if an observation is classified as fraudulent or non-fraudulent, then
a threshold of 0.5 will be considered. Consequently, the predefined decision rules
implemented in this case are the following:
• If yˆ ≥ 0.5, then FRAUD
• If yˆ < 0.5, then NON-FRAUD
The complete subset logistic regression pseudo code is shown in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Complete subset logistic regression
1: Estimate the null logistic regression modelM0 which contains only the constant.
2: for k = 1 to K do
3: Fit all the
(
K
k
)
possible logistic regression models with exactly k predictors.
4: Calculate the average of the estimated coefficients.
5: Fit a logistic regression model using the averaged coefficients and call itMk.
6: end for
7: Select the best model among M0, M1, ..., MK according to the aforementioned
assessment criteria.
The proposed complete subset logistic regression approach will be applied next to
assist the variable selection procedure started in the previous chapter, as it will be used
to determine the optimal number of variables needed to properly model accounting
fraud. The analysis will be conducted first using all observations, without taking into
account the industry they belong to, and then a more specific evaluation industry by
industry will follow.
Before presenting the results obtained by the suggested method, two main issues will
be discussed as they are incredibly relevant when dealing with statistical models and
accounting fraud offences. In particular, subjects related to imbalance datasets and
cost-sensitive environment will be addressed to further achieve more accurate results
for both tasks, variable selection and fraud detection.
5.3 Modelling Assessment
An interesting issue related to fraudulent reporting is the difference of
misclassification costs. Most studies only seek to maximise overall accuracy
without further analysing more suitable assessment measurements.
The cost of misclassification differs when dealing with accounting fraud since a false
negative error, which is when a fraudulent observation is classified as non-fraudulent,
is usually considered more expensive that a false positive error, which is when a
non-fraudulent observation is classified as fraudulent. The reasoning behind this
is that a misclassification of a non-fraud firm may cause an important misuse of
resources and time, but a misclassification of a fraudulent company may result in
incorrect decisions and economic damage.
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Accordingly, the overall accuracy rate is no longer sufficient to assess model
performance. Other metrics, such as specificity, sensitivity and precision, are now
taken into consideration, as well as G-measure, F-measure and AUC, that are
calculated using combinations of these metrics. All mentioned indicators are based
on the confusion matrix shown in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1: Confusion matrix
Predicted Positives Predicted Negatives
Real Positives TP FN
Real Negatives FP TN
Model assessment metrics are described next, including the formula used to calculate
them when appropriate.
1. Overall Accuracy: it measures the ability to differentiate both fraudulent and
genuine observations correctly. It is calculated as the proportion of true positive
and true negative cases compared to the total number of observations.
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
(5.6)
2. Specificity: it evaluates the ability to determine non-fraudulent cases correctly.
As such, it is computed as the proportion of true negative compared to all
legitimate negative observations.
specificity =
TN
TN + FP
(5.7)
3. Sensitivity: it assesses the capacity to classify fraudulent cases correctly. It
is then calculated as the proportion of true positive cases compared to all
legitimate positive observations.
sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
(5.8)
4. Precision: it measures the proportion of true positive cases compared to all
predicted positive observations.
precision =
TP
TP + FP
(5.9)
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5. G-Mean: is the geometric mean of sensitivity and specificity measures. As
such, it takes into account the ability of correctly classifying both fraudulent
and non-fraudulent observations.
G−Mean =
√
sensitivity ∗ specificity (5.10)
6. F-Measure: is a metric that integrates both measures of precision and sensitivity
F −Measure = 2 ∗ precision ∗ sensitivity
precision+ sensitivity
(5.11)
7. AUC: The Area Under the Curve (AUC) is a point estimate of the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which evaluates the diagnostic ability
of a binary classifier model as a function of varying a decision threshold. As
such, it assesses both true positive and false positive rates considering different
threshold settings. The AUC is the probability that the binary classifier will rank
a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative
one. As such, AUC is always a positive number range between 0 and 1, so the
closer to the unit, the better is the model as it means it is correctly separating
instances into the non-fraud and fraud groups. The AUC is computed using
the trapezoidal rule, which is a commonly used technique for approximating a
definite integral.
Regulatory authorities face critical limitations in terms of human resources, budget
support and time constrains, thus a detailed investigation of all records and
companies is infeasible or too expensive to undertake. Investigations should
concentrate on those firms that are more likely to perpetrate accounting fraud.
Therefore, it is preferable to focus on models that correctly classify fraudulent
observations rather than non-fraudulent cases.
For this reason, G-measure, F-measure and AUC will be used as model assessment
criteria, since they properly capture both false positive and false negative errors,
and mitigate the misclassification issue inherent when detecting accounting fraud
offences.
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5.4 Results
The aforementioned complete subset logistic regression has been adopted to assist in
the variable selection task, in particular to evaluate the number of variables required
to satisfactory classify fraudulent and genuine financial reports. The implementation
of the proposed approach has been done in two scenarios, first using the entire sample
and then considering industry specification.
In Chapter 4, a very comprehensive analysis of financial ratios was performed in order
to evaluate whether ratio information is useful to detect accounting fraud. Overall, 13
out of the original 20 ratios were found to be significant as explanatory variables of
fraudulent reporting. A complementary analysis will be conducted next to further
justify the number of predictors needed in different scenarios.
It is worth mentioning, before further interpretation of the results, that all
classification accuracy metrics are calculated using out-of-sample data, that is,
considering all the data points not belonging to the training sample. Furthermore,
the considered model will learn the parameters of a prediction function from a subset
of the available data and further tested in a different scenario in order to generalise the
results. A standard practice in statistics is to hold out part of the dataset, commonly
called testing set, and use it later to assess the performance of the model.
Therefore, a stratified 10-fold cross-validation approach is implemented before
running the proposed variable selection technique. As such, the studied dataset is
divided in 10 folds, each one containing an equal number of fraud and non-fraud
cases. For each fold, the model is trained by using the remaining nine folds and then
validated by using the hold out fold. At last, model performance is calculated as the
average performance of all testing folds (Kirkos, Spathis, and Manolopoulos, 2007).
It can be seen from Table 5.2 that, in general, accuracy metrics show poor classification
performance when considering all sampled observations. The optimal number of
predictors in this case is somewhere between 2 and 7. The insufficient predictive
power may be due to the fact that observations from different industries differ
notoriously, hence trying to find a common criminal pattern is a hopeless task.
As implementing only a single model has come at the expense of reduced fraud
detection power, then it make sense to build separate models for different industry
areas. Accordingly, industry-specific analysis and results are discussed in what
follows.
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TABLE 5.2: CSLR classification accuracy - All industries
Sample Size: 3,188
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.555 0.278 0.836 0.533 0.482 0.651 0.557
2 0.565 0.344 0.789 0.543 0.521 0.643 0.567
3 0.559 0.365 0.756 0.540 0.525 0.630 0.560
4 0.559 0.373 0.747 0.540 0.528 0.627 0.560
5 0.562 0.386 0.741 0.543 0.535 0.627 0.563
6 0.559 0.388 0.733 0.541 0.533 0.623 0.560
7 0.561 0.394 0.731 0.543 0.537 0.623 0.562
8 0.558 0.392 0.726 0.541 0.534 0.620 0.559
9 0.546 0.386 0.709 0.532 0.523 0.608 0.548
10 0.553 0.388 0.720 0.537 0.529 0.615 0.554
11 0.551 0.388 0.716 0.535 0.527 0.613 0.552
12 0.551 0.396 0.707 0.536 0.529 0.610 0.552
13 0.550 0.400 0.701 0.535 0.530 0.607 0.551
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
From Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2a, it can be said that the performance of the logistic
subset approach does not vary with different values of k in this particular industry.
It seems the models are always making the same predictions, regardless of the
explanatory variables at issue.
This is probably due to the small size of the studied sample. There are only
22 observations in total, out of which only 11 are fraudulent cases. As such, it
is likely that no important differences were found between the groups, hence no
classification rules can be made for this industry. In light of this, it is tempting
to exclude this industry from the analysis performed as no solid feedback can be
drawn. Nonetheless, it is decided to keep observations belonging to this industry
as an illustrative exercise where no intentions of generalising results is sought.
Mining and Construction
More meaningful results are obtained in this industry as the sample size increased.
It can be observed from Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2b that G-Mean, F-Measure and AUC
metrics are larger when considering a number of predictors between 7 and 11.
These results are in accordance with the ones obtained in the ratio analysis performed
before, as it was shown that 10 variables were significant when detecting accounting
fraud offences. Therefore, there is enough evidence to select them as a reduced set of
explanatory variables to be ultimately used for modelling.
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(A) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (B) Mining and Construction
(C) Manufacturing
(D) Transportation, Communications, Electric,
Gas and Sanitary Service
(E) Wholesale and Retail Trade (F) Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
(G) Services (H) Public Administration
FIGURE 5.2: CSLR Classification Accuracy by Industry
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TABLE 5.3: CSLR classification accuracy
Industry: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Sample Size: 22
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
2 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
3 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
4 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
5 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
6 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
7 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
8 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
9 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
10 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
11 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
12 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
13 0.429 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.447 0.500 0.600
TABLE 5.4: CSLR classification accuracy
Industry: Mining and Construction
Sample Size: 104
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.656 0.688 0.625 0.667 0.656 0.645 0.656
2 0.688 0.750 0.625 0.714 0.685 0.667 0.688
3 0.688 0.750 0.625 0.714 0.685 0.667 0.688
4 0.688 0.750 0.625 0.714 0.685 0.667 0.688
5 0.688 0.750 0.625 0.714 0.685 0.667 0.688
6 0.688 0.750 0.625 0.714 0.685 0.667 0.688
7 0.719 0.812 0.625 0.769 0.713 0.690 0.719
8 0.719 0.812 0.625 0.769 0.713 0.690 0.719
9 0.719 0.812 0.625 0.769 0.713 0.690 0.719
10 0.719 0.812 0.625 0.769 0.713 0.690 0.719
11 0.719 0.812 0.625 0.769 0.713 0.690 0.719
12 0.688 0.812 0.562 0.750 0.676 0.643 0.688
13 0.688 0.812 0.562 0.750 0.676 0.643 0.688
Manufacturing
Poor classification accuracy is found in the case of manufacturing firms, as it can be
seen in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.2c, since values of G-Mean, F-Measure and AUC are
fairly small for all subsets.
Nevertheless, slightly better performance is shown when k is between 7 and 10.
In addition, ratio analysis results suggested 6 explanatory variables as significant,
hence it seems adequate to use them as selected predictors when accounting fraud
modelling is required.
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TABLE 5.5: CSLR classification accuracy
Industry: Manufacturing
Sample Size: 1,218
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.473 0.971 0.016 0.375 0.124 0.030 0.494
2 0.492 0.880 0.136 0.553 0.346 0.218 0.508
3 0.516 0.794 0.262 0.581 0.456 0.361 0.528
4 0.530 0.737 0.340 0.586 0.501 0.430 0.539
5 0.533 0.691 0.387 0.578 0.518 0.464 0.539
6 0.530 0.634 0.435 0.565 0.525 0.491 0.534
7 0.541 0.623 0.466 0.574 0.539 0.514 0.544
8 0.549 0.606 0.497 0.579 0.549 0.535 0.552
9 0.555 0.594 0.518 0.582 0.555 0.548 0.556
10 0.549 0.566 0.534 0.573 0.550 0.553 0.550
11 0.541 0.554 0.529 0.564 0.541 0.546 0.542
12 0.544 0.531 0.555 0.564 0.543 0.559 0.543
13 0.544 0.537 0.550 0.565 0.543 0.557 0.543
Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service
Ambiguous results are obtained when implementing the proposed methodology in
this industry. It can be observed from Table 5.6 and Figure 5.2d that accuracy metrics
are larger when the number of predictors is between 1 and 3, and then again when k
is 7 and 10, respectively.
Financial ratio analysis showed 5 meaningful variables when detecting accounting
fraud offences, that will ultimately be selected for modelling as complete subset
approach does not support any other alternative set of potential predictors.
TABLE 5.6: CSLR classification accuracy
Industry: Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary
Service
Sample Size: 212
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.562 0.933 0.235 0.800 0.469 0.364 0.584
2 0.625 0.867 0.412 0.778 0.597 0.538 0.639
3 0.625 0.733 0.529 0.692 0.623 0.600 0.631
4 0.562 0.600 0.529 0.600 0.564 0.562 0.565
5 0.516 0.500 0.529 0.545 0.514 0.537 0.515
6 0.500 0.467 0.529 0.529 0.497 0.529 0.498
7 0.531 0.500 0.559 0.559 0.529 0.559 0.529
8 0.500 0.433 0.559 0.528 0.492 0.543 0.496
9 0.516 0.433 0.588 0.541 0.505 0.563 0.511
10 0.547 0.467 0.618 0.568 0.537 0.592 0.542
11 0.531 0.467 0.588 0.556 0.524 0.571 0.527
12 0.531 0.467 0.588 0.556 0.524 0.571 0.527
13 0.531 0.467 0.588 0.556 0.524 0.571 0.527
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Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade
Poor classification accuracy is found in the case of trading firms as values of G-Mean,
F-Measure and AUC are fairly small for all subsets. Nevertheless, it can be observed
from Table 5.7 and Figure 5.2e that slightly better performance is achieved when k is
between 2 and 4, which is in agreement with the results obtained in the ratio analysis,
as it suggested 3 explanatory variables as significant. Consequently, it makes sense to
use them as selected predictors when accounting fraud modelling is performed.
TABLE 5.7: CSLR classification accuracy
Industry: Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade
Sample Size: 338
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.500 0.680 0.327 0.515 0.471 0.400 0.503
2 0.559 0.640 0.481 0.581 0.555 0.526 0.560
3 0.549 0.580 0.519 0.562 0.549 0.540 0.550
4 0.549 0.540 0.558 0.558 0.549 0.558 0.549
5 0.549 0.540 0.558 0.558 0.549 0.558 0.549
6 0.529 0.520 0.538 0.538 0.529 0.538 0.529
7 0.529 0.520 0.538 0.538 0.529 0.538 0.529
8 0.520 0.500 0.538 0.528 0.519 0.533 0.519
9 0.520 0.500 0.538 0.528 0.519 0.533 0.519
10 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.510 0.500 0.505 0.500
11 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.510 0.500 0.505 0.500
12 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.510 0.500 0.505 0.500
13 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.510 0.500 0.505 0.500
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Interesting results are observed in the financial industry, as better performance is
obtained when more variables are included in the analysis. As it can be seen in Table
5.8 and Figure 5.2f, G-Mean, F-Measure and AUC metrics are larger when considering
a number of predictors larger or equal than 8.
These results are in accordance with the outcome obtained in the ratio analysis
where exactly eight variables were significant. Hence, there is enough evidence to
select them as a reduced set of explanatory variables to be ultimately used when
implementing a fraud detection mechanism.
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TABLE 5.8: CSLR classification accuracy
Industry: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Sample Size: 472
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.479 0.984 0.076 0.857 0.273 0.140 0.530
2 0.500 0.937 0.152 0.750 0.377 0.253 0.544
3 0.500 0.873 0.203 0.667 0.420 0.311 0.538
4 0.542 0.841 0.304 0.706 0.506 0.425 0.573
5 0.528 0.794 0.316 0.658 0.501 0.427 0.555
6 0.549 0.778 0.367 0.674 0.534 0.475 0.572
7 0.542 0.730 0.392 0.646 0.535 0.488 0.561
8 0.563 0.730 0.430 0.667 0.561 0.523 0.580
9 0.563 0.714 0.443 0.660 0.563 0.530 0.579
10 0.570 0.714 0.456 0.667 0.571 0.541 0.585
11 0.585 0.714 0.481 0.679 0.586 0.563 0.598
12 0.613 0.730 0.519 0.707 0.616 0.599 0.625
13 0.606 0.698 0.532 0.689 0.609 0.600 0.615
Services
Table 5.9 and Figure 5.2g summarise the results obtained when adopting a complete
subset approach in the service industry. It can be observed better performance when
k is between 3 and 6, as accuracy metrics are larger in this range of subsets.
One more time, these results are in accordance with the ratio analysis performed in
Chapter 4.1, as 6 variables were found to be significant as predictors of accounting
fraud offences. Therefore, it makes sense to use them as explanatory variables for
detecting fraudulent financial reports.
TABLE 5.9: CSLR classification accuracy
Industry: Services
Sample Size: 750
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.564 0.271 0.888 0.525 0.491 0.660 0.580
2 0.613 0.373 0.879 0.560 0.572 0.684 0.626
3 0.627 0.415 0.860 0.571 0.598 0.687 0.638
4 0.649 0.475 0.841 0.592 0.632 0.695 0.658
5 0.640 0.483 0.813 0.588 0.627 0.682 0.648
6 0.627 0.483 0.785 0.579 0.616 0.667 0.634
7 0.622 0.492 0.766 0.577 0.614 0.659 0.629
8 0.609 0.492 0.738 0.568 0.602 0.642 0.615
9 0.600 0.492 0.720 0.562 0.595 0.631 0.606
10 0.600 0.500 0.710 0.563 0.596 0.628 0.605
11 0.604 0.508 0.710 0.567 0.601 0.631 0.609
12 0.600 0.508 0.701 0.564 0.597 0.625 0.605
13 0.591 0.508 0.682 0.557 0.589 0.613 0.595
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Public Administration
Finally, an exceptional performance of the proposed methodology can be seen for
public administration institutions as accuracy measures are fairly large for all values
of k. In particular, better results are obtained when the number of predictors is 6 or
more, similar to what was found in the financial ratio analysis. In consequence, 8
ratios will be used to further model accounting fraud within this economic sector.
TABLE 5.10: CSLR classification accuracy
Industry: Public Administration
Sample Size: 72
k Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
1 0.682 0.636 0.727 0.667 0.680 0.696 0.682
2 0.727 0.636 0.818 0.692 0.722 0.750 0.727
3 0.727 0.636 0.818 0.692 0.722 0.750 0.727
4 0.682 0.545 0.818 0.643 0.668 0.720 0.682
5 0.682 0.545 0.818 0.643 0.668 0.720 0.682
6 0.727 0.545 0.909 0.667 0.704 0.769 0.727
7 0.727 0.545 0.909 0.667 0.704 0.769 0.727
8 0.727 0.545 0.909 0.667 0.704 0.769 0.727
9 0.727 0.545 0.909 0.667 0.704 0.769 0.727
10 0.727 0.545 0.909 0.667 0.704 0.769 0.727
11 0.727 0.545 0.909 0.667 0.704 0.769 0.727
12 0.727 0.545 0.909 0.667 0.704 0.769 0.727
13 0.727 0.545 0.909 0.667 0.704 0.769 0.727
Lastly, a summary table is provided below (Table 5.11) including financial ratios that
have been selected for each industry.
Interesting differences between sectors emerge from the previously performed
analysis as some ratios are significant or not depending on the industry the company
belongs to.
On one hand, inventory and retained earnings are relevant predictors in the industries
of transportation, communication, electric gas and sanitary service, wholesale trade
and retail trade, and services. This may be due to the fact that inventory volumes and
retained earning are easily falsified within the aforementioned sectors.
On the other hand, manufacturing companies may be tempted to modify items related
to liabilities as well as current assets, while finance, insurance and real estate firms
manipulate liabilities and cash flow from operation figures.
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5.5 Summary
In Chapter 5, a simple yet novel approach is expanded from the well-known complete
subset regression approach to ultimately assist the selection of significant explanatory
variables performed in the previous chapter. It is interesting to see that results
from the proposed methodology strongly support the number of selected ratios as
predictors of accounting fraud in two scenarios, first omitting industry features and
then using domain-specific samples.
In the next chapter, several machine learning models will be implemented in order to
achieve satisfactory detection rates of accounting fraud offences. In this regard, basic
and more complex predictive models are described and adopted for determining the
likelihood of accounting fraud occurrence along with interpretation of overall and
industry-specific results.
88
Chapter 5. Complete Subset Logistic Regression
TABLE 5.11: Summary of selected financial ratios by industry domain
TLTA
TLTE
LTDTA
Mining and Construction 10 RETA
CACL
RVSA
IVTA
IVCOGS
PYCOGS
SATA
TLTA
TLTE
Manufacturing 6 RETA
CATA
CACL
RVSA
RETA
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 5 IVSA
Gas and Sanitary Service IVTA
PYCOGS
SATA
RETA
Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade 3 CATA
IVSA
TLTA
TLTE
LTDTA
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 8 RETA
CFFONI
IVCOGS
PYCOGS
SATA
RETA
CACL
Services 6 IVSA
IVCOGS
PYCOGS
SATA
LTDTA
RETA
CATA
Public Administration 8 CACL
IVSA
IVTA
IVCOGS
SATA
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Accounting Fraud Modelling
6.1 Statistical Modelling
Implementation and assessment of analytical models has already been accomplished
in the previous chapter to assess the selection of significant explanatory variables. In
particular, an extension of the complete subset linear regression has been adopted
using a logistic approach instead. More accurate results have been obtained as more
advanced methodologies have been implemented, which certainly motivates the use
of statistical models for accounting fraud detection.
In what follows, several machine learning methods will be properly described,
implemented and further interpreted in order to achieve satisfactory detection rates.
Moreover, a breakdown of the analysis is adopted considering the industry in which
firms belong to, by virtue of exposing domain-specific fraudulent behaviours.
6.2 Machine Learning Methods
The binary outcome model is considered to be the foundational scheme for detecting
accounting fraud since the aim is to classify future observations into only two possible
values: fraud or non-fraud.
Accordingly, this study assesses the effectiveness of several machine learning models
in the identification of fraudulent reporting. First, Discriminant Analysis and Logistic
Regression are employed as benchmark framework followed by the implementation
of more advanced but easy-to-interpret algorithms such as AdaBoost, Decision Trees,
Boosted Trees and Random Forests.
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The motivation for using boosting techniques and tree-based methods is supported
in part by the poor detection accuracy of basic models and in part by the excessive
complexity of more sophisticated approaches, such as neural networks and support
vector machines.
In order to achieve a consistent notation throughout the chapter, the following
conventions are used for mathematical equations:
• A superscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix or vector.
• Y = 1: fraudulent observation.
• Y = 0: non-fraudulent observation.
• P (Y = 1 | X): posterior probability of fraud.
• P (Y = 0 | X): posterior probability of non-fraud.
It is worth noting that given there are only two possible outcomes, then it holds that:
P (Y = 0 | X) = 1− P (Y = 1 | X) (6.1)
The models were employed as implemented in the Scikit-Learn library (Pedregosa
et al., 2011) and an exhaustive explanation of each algorithm is given below.
6.2.1 Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis is a supervised method used in statistics to address
classification problems and to make predictions of a categorical dependent variable.
The main idea is to classify an observation into one of the predefined classes using a
combination of one or more continuous independent variables in order to generate a
discriminant function which best differentiate between the groups.
Subsequently, a decision boundary is generated by fitting class conditional densities
P (X | Y ) to the data using Bayes’ rule:
P (Y | X) = P (X | Y )P (Y )
P (X)
=
P (X | Y )P (Y )∑
y P (X | Y = y)P (Y = y)
(6.2)
The appropriate class is selected which maximises these conditional probabilities. In
the case of accounting fraud, only two classes are of interest; therefore:
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P (Y = 0 | X) = P (X | Y = 0)P (Y = 0)
P (X | Y = 0)P (Y = 0) + P (X | Y = 1)P (Y = 1) (6.3)
P (Y = 1 | X) = P (X | Y = 1)P (Y = 1)
P (X | Y = 0)P (Y = 0) + P (X | Y = 1)P (Y = 1) (6.4)
The optimisation task is ultimately achieved using the training data to estimate class
priors, both P (Y = 0) and P (Y = 1), class means and the covariance matrices.
In particular, class priors are estimated as the proportion of instances in each class,
that is, number of fraudulent (or non-fraudulent) observation divided by the total
number of observations. Class means are estimated using the empirical sample class
means. Similarly, covariance matrices are estimated using the empirical sample class
covariance matrices.
In accordance with the aforementioned, the following assumptions are made:
1. Predictors are all statistically independent.
2. P (X | Y ) follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution, with a class-specific
mean and covariance matrix.
Different assumptions associated with the covariance matrix will lead to different
decision boundaries, one defined by a linear combination of the predictors and
another one by a quadratic form.
In both cases, however, the predicted class will be determined using a classification
threshold of 0.5. As such, if the estimated probability of fraud occurrence (P (Y = 1))
is equal or higher than 0.5, then the observation will be classified as fraudulent. On
the contrary, if P (Y = 1) is lower than 0.5, or equivalently P (Y = 0) ≥ 0.5, then the
observation will be classified as non-fraudulent.
Linear Discriminant Analysis
In the particular case of Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), a multivariate normal
distribution of the predictors is presumed with a distinct mean for each class and a
covariance matrix that is common to all classes. For AF detection, this means that
both fraud and non-fraud classes share the same covariance matrix Σ0 = Σ1 = Σ.
The advantage of a common covariance matrix is that it simplifies the problem by
reducing the computational cost of estimating a large number of parameters when
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the number of predictors is relatively large. Taking this into consideration, then it is
true that:
P (X | Y = 0) = 1
(2pi)n |Σ|1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(X − µ0)TΣ−1(X − µ0)
)
(6.5)
P (X | Y = 1) = 1
(2pi)n |Σ|1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(X − µ1)TΣ−1(X − µ1)
)
(6.6)
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
Furthermore, Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) provides a similar approach
yet now it is assumed that the covariance matrix is class-specific, i.e.: X ∼ N(µk,Σk)
for the kth class. Therefore:
P (X | Y = 0) = 1
(2pi)n |Σ0|1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(X − µ0)TΣ−10 (X − µ0)
)
(6.7)
P (X | Y = 1) = 1
(2pi)n |Σ1|1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(X − µ1)TΣ−11 (X − µ1)
)
(6.8)
6.2.2 Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression (LR) models are commonly used for performing binary
classification. As described in Chapter 5.2, the goal is to fit a regression model that
estimates the accounting fraud likelihood applying a logistic function that is linear in
its argument:
σ(Z) =
1
1 + exp(−Z) (6.9)
In order to obtain the best classification possible, the posterior probability of
belonging to one of both categories is calculated by maximising the likelihood
function. Likewise, let P (Y = 1 | X) be the posterior probability of fraud (Bishop,
2006), then:
P (Y = 1 | X) = y(X) = σ(wTX) (6.10)
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For a dataset {xn, tn}, where tn ∈ {0,1} and n = 1, ..., N , the likelihood of any specific
outcome is given by:
P (t | w) =
∑
n
ytnn {1− yn}1−tn (6.11)
where t = (t1, ..., tN )T and yn = P (Y = 1 | xn).
As mentioned before, the maximum likelihood estimates of w are obtain by
minimising the cross-entropy error function defined by the negative logarithm of the
likelihood and then taking its gradient with respect to w:
E(w) = −ln{P (t | w)} = −
∑
n
{tnln(yn) + (1− tn)ln(1− yn)} (6.12)
5 E(w) =
∑
n
(yn − tn)xn (6.13)
To finally decide if an observation is classified as fraudulent or non-fraudulent, then
a threshold of 0.5 will be considered. Consequently, if P (Y = 1 | X) is estimated
to be equal or greater than 0.5, then the observation will be classified as fraudulent.
Otherwise, it will be classified as non-fraudulent.
In this section, a logistic regression methodology will be implemented using all
explanatory variables of interest rather than the subset approach previously adopted
in Chapter 5.
More advanced statistical models will be introduced next. As mentioned in Section
2.7, several complex machine learning methods have been developed in previous
studies to detect fraudulent accounting records, such as Bayesian networks, support
vector machines and hybrid algorithms. The achieved performance of all these
techniques are quite superior to more basic methods, but the cost of this improvement
is somehow high when taking into account the considerable drawbacks that these
methods entail, including important computational costs and overfitting proneness,
as well as struggling when interpreting results.
Consequently, decision trees and boosting techniques are suggested to be
implemented as their advantages can be very useful when detecting accounting fraud.
More details about the proposed methods will be discuss in what follows.
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6.2.3 AdaBoost
Adaptive boosting, widely known as AdaBoost (AB), is a machine learning technique
used for classification and regression problems that combines multiple ’weak learner’
classifiers in order to produce a better boosted classifier. In this context, a weak learner
is a function that is only weakly correlated with the response.
The basic idea is to weight observations wn by how easy or difficult they are to
categorise, giving more importance to those that are harder to predict in order to learn
from them and further construct better subsequent classifiers.
Accordingly, each individual classifier generates an output Gm(X), m = 1, ...,M ,
for every observation n of the training set. Then, these classifiers are trained on a
weighted form using αm as classifier coefficients. As mentioned before, misclassified
instances will be given greater weight when used to train the subsequent classifier
(Bishop, 2006).
The goal is to minimise a weighted error function errm in every iteration m taking
into account the information and performance of previous classifiers. Ultimately and
after the last iteration M , a final boost classifier G(X) is constructed as an additive
combination of all trained weak learner classifiers Gm(X):
G(X) = sign[
∑
m
αmGm(X)] (6.14)
In this case, a classification threshold of 0.5 has been adopted. As such, an observation
will be classified as fraudulent when G(X) is equal or greater than 0.5, and classified
as non-fraudulent when G(X) is lower than 0.5.
The AdaBoost pseudo code is shown in Algorithm 21.
1Scharth, M. (2017). Statistical Learning and Data Mining, Module 15 [PowerPoint presentation].
Discipline of Business Analytics, The University of Sydney Business School, QBUS6810.
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Algorithm 2 AdaBoost
1: Initialise the observation weights wn = 1/N , n = 1, ..., N .
2: for m = 1 to M do
3: Fit a classifier Gm(X) to the training data using weights wn.
4: Compute the weighted error rate.
errm =
∑
n wnI(yn 6= G−m(xn))∑
n wn
5: Compute αm = log((1− errm)/errm).
6: Update the weights,
wn ← wnexp[αmI(yn 6= Gm(xn)]
7: end for
8: Output the classification G(X) = sign[
∑
m αmGm(X)].
6.2.4 Decision Trees
Decision Trees (DT) are a non-parametric supervised learning method that classify
observations based on the values of one or more predictors. The advantage of
decision trees lies in the straightforward extraction of if-then classification rules easily
replicable by auditors and regulatory authorities. Also, no assumptions on the
structure of the data is needed, which is very convenient in this case considering the
asymmetrical distribution of some explanatory variables.
The structure of a DT consists of nodes representing a test on a particular attribute
and branches representing an outcome of the test. The idea is to divide observations
into mutually exclusive classes in order to build the smallest set of rules that is
consistent with the training data. To identify the attribute that best separates the
sample, information gain and entropy reduction are used as estimation criteria.
There are several tree algorithms, such as ID3, C4.5, C5.0 and CART, among others.
The chosen method used in this study is the Classification and Regression Trees
(CART) characterised by the construction of binary trees based-on feature and
threshold selection that provide the largest information gain in each node. This
algorithm recursively partitions the space in order to minimise the error or impurity
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of each node, resulting in terminal nodes that represent homogeneous groups that
differ substantially from the others.
Accordingly, let the information at node m be Q, then the binary partition of the data
is defined by a candidate split θ that divides the space into two subsets: Qleft(θ) and
Qright(θ).
The error at node m is calculated using an impurity function H evaluated in both
partitions, that later is minimised in order to estimate the parameters.
G(Q, θ) =
nleft
Nm
H(Qleft(θ)) +
nright
Nm
H(Qright(θ)) (6.15)
θ∗ = argminθG(Q, θ) (6.16)
The impurity function implemented in this study corresponds to the Gini function:
H(Xm) =
∑
k
pmk(1− pmk) (6.17)
where pmk is the proportion of class k observations in node m.
It is worth noting that the partitions of the predictor space are based on a greedy
algorithm called recursive binary splitting. The technique is greedy because at the best
split is made at each step of the tree-building process without taking into account
the consequences further down the tree. Consequently, in some cases very complex
trees are generated as result of this approach, what is commonly known in statistical
jargon as overfitting. However, a couple of mechanisms can be used in order to avoid
this situation, such as setting the minimum number of required observations at a leaf
node or setting the maximum depth of the tree.
The tree size is therefore a tuning parameter determining the complexity of the model
and it should be selected adaptively from the data. As such, the maximum number
of node splits in the current study is settled as 5, optimal valued obtained by cross
validation.
Decision trees are remarkably superior than the first two methods mentioned before
- logistic regression and discriminant analysis - considering how easy they are to
explain, implement and visualise. Unfortunately, they show some drawbacks that
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should be mentioned, such as their inherent instability that emerges when little
changes in the data cause a large change in the structure of the estimated tree, as
well as the lower predictive accuracy when compared to more advanced techniques.
Decision trees can be used as the basic component of powerful prediction methods.
Therefore, two additional models that employ decision trees as their foundation, will
be introduce below.
6.2.5 Boosted Trees
Similar to the AdaBoost approach, Boosted Trees (BT) is an ensemble of weak learners
but now in the explicit form of fixed size decision trees as base classifiers.
Accordingly, an iterative process takes place in order to fit a decision tree output
hm(X) in every iteration m to improve the previous model Fm(X) by constructing
a new model that adds this new information:
Fm+1(X) = Fm(X) + hm(X) (6.18)
The main idea is to minimise an error function defined by the difference between the
old model Fm(X) and the new one Fm+1(X), what is called the residual, through a
gradient boosting algorithm that is much like the gradient descent method used in
the logistic regression approach.
In this case, a classification threshold of 0.5 has also been adopted. In this regard, an
observation will be classified as fraudulent when Fm(X) is equal or greater than 0.5,
and classified as non-fraudulent when Fm(X) is lower than 0.5.
Same as in the decision tree methodology and for consistency, the maximum depth of
the fitted trees is established to be 5.
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6.2.6 Random Forests
A further enhancement of boosted trees is provided by the Random Forests (RF)
approach, one of the most popular bagging techniques. Bootstrap aggregation, or
bagging, averages many noisy but approximately unbiased models, which results in
a reduction of the variance.
The idea is to fit a classification model to the training data D to obtain the prediction
fˆ(X). Bagging averages this prediction over a collection of bootstrap samples2. For
each bootstrap sample D∗b , b = 1, ..., B, the selected classification model is fitted to
obtain a prediction fˆ∗b (X). The bagged classifier selects the class (fraud or non-fraud)
with the most “votes” from the B classifiers:
yˆbag(X) = arg max
c
∑
b
I(yˆ∗b (X) = c) (6.19)
Decision trees are ideal candidates for bagging as they capture complex interactions
structures in the data, which leads to relatively low biased but high variance.
Consequently, classification trees are adopted next for bagging to further construct
Random Forests.
Random Forests improve over bagging by adding an adjustment that helps
decorrelate the trees. In this context, instead of using all predictors, RF only selects a
random subset of the features as split candidates in each step. The rationale behind
this methodology is that when establishing a fewer and fixed number of predictors,
then more variation in the structure of the model is allowed, which diminishes the
correlation between the resulting trees. Interestingly, this new condition makes the
average of the fitted trees less variable and therefore more reliable (James et al., 2013).
In building a random forest, k independent variables out of all possible predictors are
randomly selected at each node, and later the best split on the considered variables is
found. As a last step, all trees are averaged to obtain a final prediction.
The Random Forests pseudo code is shown in Algorithm 33.
2In statistics, bootstrapping is any test or metric that relies on random sampling with replacement.
3Scharth, M. (2017). Statistical Learning and Data Mining, Module 13 [PowerPoint presentation].
Discipline of Business Analytics, The University of Sydney Business School, QBUS6810.
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Algorithm 3 Random Forest
1: for b = 1 to B do
2: Sample N observations with replacement from the training dataD to obtain the
bootstrap sample D∗b .
3: Grow a random forest tree Tb to D∗b by repeating the following steps for each
terminal node of the tree, until the minimum node size is reached:
4: (i) Select k variables at random from the K variables.
5: (ii) Pick the best variable and split point among the k candidates.
6: (iii) Split the node into two daughter nodes.
7: end for
8: Output the ensemble of trees {Tb}B1 .
In order to be consistent with the previous methodologies, the maximum depth of the
estimated trees is established to be 5.
6.3 Results
The main objective of machine learning is to correctly make predictions on data. For
this end, and to avoid overfitting, a model should learn the parameters of a prediction
function from a subset of the available data and be tested in a different scenario in
order to generalise the results. A standard practice in statistics is to hold out part of
the dataset, commonly called testing set, and use it later to assess the performance of
the model.
Therefore, a stratified 10-fold cross-validation approach is implemented before
running the proposed techniques. As such, the studied dataset is divided in 10 folds,
each one containing an equal number of fraud and non-fraud cases. For each fold, the
models are trained by using the remaining nine folds and then validated by using the
hold out fold. At last, models performance is calculated as the average performance
of all testing folds (Kirkos, Spathis, and Manolopoulos, 2007).
It is worth recalling that explanatory variables used to train and test the proposed
models are the thirteen financial ratios selected in Chapter 4 and later validated in
Chapter 5: TLTA, TLTE, LTDTA, RETA, CATA, CACL, CFFONI, RVSA, IVSA, IVTA,
IVCOGS, PYCOGS and SATA.
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In order to accurately evaluate the predictive power of the proposed machine learning
methods, all assessment metrics defined in Section 5.3 are calculated using the testing
data exclusively, that is, using the out-of-sample data.
Table 6.1 reports the results of the proposed models considering observations from all
sectors indistinctly of the industries they belong.
TABLE 6.1: General Prediction Accuracy
Sample size: 3,188
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
LDA 0.551 0.490 0.607 0.562 0.545 0.583 0.549
QDA 0.555 0.163 0.919 0.542 0.387 0.682 0.541
LR 0.551 0.449 0.645 0.557 0.538 0.598 0.547
AB 0.577 0.566 0.587 0.593 0.576 0.590 0.576
DT 0.565 0.295 0.817 0.555 0.491 0.661 0.556
BT 0.608 0.588 0.627 0.621 0.607 0.624 0.607
RF 0.554 0.482 0.621 0.563 0.547 0.591 0.551
It can be observed that overall, models are not showing exceptional performance.
Average accuracy rates indicate that the proposed models are at least slightly
better than random chance, that is, classifying 50% of observations in each group.
Furthermore, sensitivity rates are considerably higher than specificity values, which
implies that the tested algorithms tend to classify more instances as fraudulent than
as non-fraudulent.
Particularly, the largest sensitivity rate is performed by QDA which also shows the
lowest specificity rate, indicating that its predictions are excessively favouring the
positive cases. Similar situation is observed when implementing a decision tree
approach.
Better performance can be seen in the case of boosted trees as this technique shows the
highest values of G-Mean and AUC, as well as a decent rate of F-Measure, suggesting
that correct classification of non-fraud and fraud cases is performed evenly when
using this approach. In particular, a sensitivity rate of 0.627 is achieved by this model,
which indicates a correct classification of 62.7% of fraudulent companies.
As discovered in previous sections, different accounting tricks are prone to be
adopted when fraud is being committed within different industries. In consequence,
implementing machine learning models without distinguishing in which sector each
observation belongs to, will most likely lead to poor classification performance.
As such, a breakdown of the analysis is performed by industry, considering two
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scenarios, first using the complete set of predictor ratios, and then using the proposed
reduced set of ratios for each industry, meticulously detailed in the previous chapter.
Results are reported in what follows, including a detailed analysis of models
performance and selected variables, this time industry by industry.
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Good classification performance is achieved in this industry, as shown in Table 6.2.
Dissimilar results are obtained when considering different number of predictors
whatsoever, probably due to the small size of the sample at issue.
Figure 6.1 expose better results for logistic regression when using all financial ratios,
as well as extraordinary performance of QDA and AdaBoost when only the reduced
set of ratios is considered, as their specificity and sensitivity metrics notably exceed
other models. In both cases, 75% of non-fraudulent cases are correctly identified, as
well as 100% of fraudulent cases. Special care must be taken when generalising these
results, as a fairly small sample is being considered.
TABLE 6.2: Classification Accuracy Industry Specific
SIC 1: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Sample size: 22
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Complete set of financial ratios K = 13
LDA 0.429 0.500 0.333 0.333 0.408 0.333 0.417
QDA 0.571 0.250 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.667 0.625
LR 0.857 0.750 1.000 0.750 0.866 0.857 0.875
AB 0.571 0.750 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.542
DT 0.714 0.750 0.667 0.667 0.707 0.667 0.708
BT 0.857 0.750 1.000 0.750 0.866 0.857 0.875
RF 0.429 0.250 0.667 0.400 0.408 0.500 0.458
Reduced set of financial ratios k = 4
LDA 0.714 0.500 1.000 0.600 0.707 0.750 0.750
QDA 0.857 0.750 1.000 0.750 0.866 0.857 0.875
LR 0.714 0.500 1.000 0.600 0.707 0.750 0.750
AB 0.857 0.750 1.000 0.750 0.866 0.857 0.875
DT 0.571 0.750 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.542
BT 0.571 0.750 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.542
RF 0.714 0.500 1.000 0.600 0.707 0.750 0.750
102
Chapter 6. Accounting Fraud Modelling
FIGURE 6.1: Models Classification Accuracy
Industry: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Mining and Construction
Similar results can be seen for companies belonging to this industry (Table 6.3) when
considering both scenarios, the complete set of ratios and the reduced one, which
further supports the usefulness of variable selection.
Figure 6.2 expose the remarkable performance achieved by the random forests
technique when all financial ratios are used, and by decision trees and QDA when the
reduced set of variables is considered. In particular, the decision tree model correctly
classifies 83.3% of non-fraudulent firms and 80% of fraudulent companies.
TABLE 6.3: Classification Accuracy Industry Specific
SIC 2: Mining and Construction
Sample size: 104
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Complete set of financial ratios K = 13
LDA 0.688 0.833 0.600 0.857 0.707 0.706 0.717
QDA 0.781 0.833 0.750 0.882 0.791 0.811 0.792
LR 0.625 0.750 0.550 0.786 0.642 0.647 0.650
AB 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.833 0.750 0.789 0.750
DT 0.781 0.833 0.750 0.882 0.791 0.811 0.792
BT 0.750 0.833 0.700 0.875 0.764 0.778 0.767
RF 0.875 0.917 0.850 0.944 0.883 0.895 0.883
Reduced set of financial ratios k = 10
LDA 0.656 0.917 0.500 0.909 0.677 0.645 0.708
QDA 0.812 0.917 0.750 0.938 0.829 0.833 0.833
LR 0.688 0.917 0.550 0.917 0.710 0.687 0.733
AB 0.625 0.667 0.600 0.750 0.632 0.667 0.633
DT 0.812 0.833 0.800 0.889 0.816 0.842 0.817
BT 0.750 0.833 0.700 0.875 0.764 0.778 0.767
RF 0.781 1.000 0.650 1.000 0.806 0.788 0.825
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FIGURE 6.2: Models Classification Accuracy
Industry: Mining and Construction
Manufacturing
Moderate performance of the predictive models when dealing with manufacturing
firms, as evidenced in Table 6.4. Similar results are obtained when considering the
complete set of ratios and when considering the reduced one.
Figure 6.3 shows better results obtained by boosted trees when using all financial
ratios, as well as AdaBoost when only the reduced set of ratios is considered. In
this particular case, 55.7% of non-fraudulent cases and 60.9% of fraudulent cases are
correctly classified.
TABLE 6.4: Classification Accuracy Industry Specific
SIC 3: Manufacturing
Sample size: 1,218
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Complete set of financial ratios K = 13
LDA 0.533 0.321 0.754 0.515 0.492 0.612 0.538
QDA 0.516 0.107 0.944 0.503 0.318 0.656 0.526
LR 0.536 0.337 0.743 0.518 0.500 0.610 0.540
AB 0.560 0.476 0.648 0.542 0.555 0.590 0.562
DT 0.566 0.829 0.291 0.619 0.491 0.395 0.560
BT 0.617 0.594 0.642 0.602 0.618 0.622 0.618
RF 0.549 0.401 0.704 0.529 0.531 0.604 0.552
Reduced set of financial ratios k = 6
LDA 0.530 0.460 0.594 0.548 0.522 0.570 0.527
QDA 0.546 0.109 0.943 0.539 0.321 0.686 0.526
LR 0.530 0.425 0.625 0.545 0.516 0.583 0.525
AB 0.585 0.557 0.609 0.603 0.583 0.606 0.583
DT 0.555 0.259 0.823 0.551 0.461 0.660 0.541
BT 0.574 0.621 0.531 0.607 0.574 0.567 0.576
RF 0.503 0.460 0.542 0.525 0.499 0.533 0.501
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FIGURE 6.3: Models Classification Accuracy
Industry: Manufacturing
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service
Again, similar results can be seen for companies belonging to this industry when
considering the complete set of ratios and the reduced set of ratios (Table 6.5), which
reinforces the benefit of using only meaningful predictors. Furthermore, Figure 6.4
expose better performance achieved by boosted models, that is boosted trees, random
forests and AdaBoost.
TABLE 6.5: Classification Accuracy Industry Specific
SIC 4: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary
Service
Sample size: 212
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Complete set of financial ratios K = 13
LDA 0.625 0.688 0.562 0.643 0.622 0.600 0.625
QDA 0.625 0.938 0.312 0.833 0.541 0.455 0.625
LR 0.609 0.656 0.562 0.621 0.608 0.590 0.609
AB 0.672 0.750 0.594 0.704 0.667 0.644 0.672
DT 0.578 0.406 0.750 0.558 0.552 0.640 0.578
BT 0.656 0.688 0.625 0.667 0.656 0.645 0.656
RF 0.672 0.656 0.688 0.667 0.672 0.677 0.672
Reduced set of financial ratios k = 5
LDA 0.562 0.625 0.500 0.571 0.559 0.533 0.562
QDA 0.562 0.969 0.156 0.833 0.389 0.263 0.562
LR 0.578 0.594 0.562 0.581 0.578 0.571 0.578
AB 0.609 0.719 0.500 0.640 0.599 0.561 0.609
DT 0.531 0.625 0.438 0.538 0.523 0.483 0.531
BT 0.672 0.719 0.625 0.690 0.670 0.656 0.672
RF 0.656 0.562 0.750 0.632 0.650 0.686 0.656
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FIGURE 6.4: Models Classification Accuracy
Industry: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary
Service
Wholesale and Retail Trade
In the case of trading firms, it can be observed from Table 6.6 that in most of the cases,
the reduced set of ratios produce more accurate results compared to the complete set.
Figure 6.5 shows superior performance accomplished by boosted trees when detection
both fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies. Decision trees in particular, achieved
exceptional results when predicting fraudulent cases, but poor performance when
dealing with non-fraud firms.
TABLE 6.6: Classification Accuracy Industry Specific
SIC 5: Wholesale and Retail Trade
Sample size: 338
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Complete set of financial ratios K = 13
LDA 0.490 0.562 0.426 0.523 0.489 0.469 0.494
QDA 0.520 0.271 0.741 0.533 0.448 0.620 0.506
LR 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.529 0.500 0.514 0.500
AB 0.618 0.604 0.630 0.642 0.617 0.636 0.617
DT 0.667 0.479 0.833 0.643 0.632 0.726 0.656
BT 0.637 0.646 0.630 0.667 0.638 0.648 0.638
RF 0.627 0.667 0.593 0.667 0.629 0.627 0.630
Reduced set of financial ratios k = 3
LDA 0.559 0.521 0.593 0.582 0.556 0.587 0.557
QDA 0.500 0.042 0.907 0.516 0.194 0.658 0.475
LR 0.549 0.521 0.574 0.574 0.547 0.574 0.547
AB 0.608 0.542 0.667 0.621 0.601 0.643 0.604
DT 0.637 0.479 0.778 0.627 0.610 0.694 0.628
BT 0.745 0.771 0.722 0.780 0.746 0.750 0.747
RF 0.637 0.625 0.648 0.660 0.636 0.654 0.637
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FIGURE 6.5: Models Classification Accuracy
Industry: Wholesale and Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Similar results can be seen from Table 6.7 when considering the complete set of ratios
and the reduced one in the case of financial firms, again supporting the usefulness
of using only meaningful predictors. Better performance accuracy is achieved by
more advanced methodologies in both circumstances (Figure 6.6), particularly by the
booted tree model, as it correctly classifies 68.2% of non-fraudulent cases and 63.8%
of fraudulent cases.
TABLE 6.7: Classification Accuracy Industry Specific
SIC 6: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Sample size: 472
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Complete set of financial ratios K = 13
LDA 0.542 0.712 0.395 0.612 0.530 0.480 0.553
QDA 0.577 0.182 0.921 0.565 0.409 0.700 0.551
LR 0.535 0.606 0.474 0.581 0.536 0.522 0.540
AB 0.585 0.606 0.566 0.623 0.586 0.593 0.586
DT 0.592 0.424 0.737 0.596 0.559 0.659 0.581
BT 0.697 0.697 0.697 0.726 0.697 0.711 0.697
RF 0.606 0.697 0.526 0.667 0.606 0.588 0.612
Reduced set of financial ratios k = 8
LDA 0.570 0.621 0.526 0.615 0.572 0.567 0.574
QDA 0.592 0.273 0.868 0.579 0.487 0.695 0.571
LR 0.570 0.591 0.553 0.609 0.571 0.579 0.572
AB 0.648 0.621 0.671 0.671 0.646 0.671 0.646
DT 0.627 0.561 0.684 0.642 0.619 0.662 0.622
BT 0.655 0.682 0.632 0.696 0.656 0.662 0.657
RF 0.627 0.652 0.605 0.667 0.628 0.634 0.628
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FIGURE 6.6: Models Classification Accuracy
Industry: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Services
Relatively good performance achieved by machine learning methods when detecting
accounting fraud within the service industry, in particular when more advanced
techniques are implemented, as evidenced in Figure 6.7.
One more time, similar results can be seen from Table 6.8 in both scenarios, that
is, when considering the complete set of ratios and the reduced set, reinforcing the
benefits of using only significant predictors.
TABLE 6.8: Classification Accuracy Industry Specific
SIC 7: Services
Sample size: 750
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Complete set of financial ratios K = 13
LDA 0.573 0.394 0.741 0.566 0.541 0.642 0.568
QDA 0.604 0.266 0.922 0.572 0.495 0.706 0.594
LR 0.547 0.413 0.672 0.549 0.527 0.605 0.543
AB 0.649 0.615 0.681 0.653 0.647 0.667 0.648
DT 0.618 0.578 0.655 0.623 0.615 0.639 0.617
BT 0.684 0.688 0.681 0.699 0.685 0.690 0.685
RF 0.676 0.606 0.741 0.667 0.670 0.702 0.673
Reduced set of financial ratios k = 6
LDA 0.587 0.468 0.698 0.583 0.572 0.635 0.583
QDA 0.587 0.229 0.922 0.560 0.460 0.697 0.576
LR 0.587 0.495 0.672 0.586 0.577 0.627 0.584
AB 0.627 0.550 0.698 0.623 0.620 0.659 0.624
DT 0.631 0.615 0.647 0.641 0.630 0.644 0.631
BT 0.631 0.550 0.707 0.626 0.624 0.664 0.629
RF 0.618 0.477 0.750 0.604 0.598 0.669 0.614
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FIGURE 6.7: Models Classification Accuracy
Industry: Services
Public Administration
Exceptional results are obtained in the industry of public administration, as it is
observed in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.8, in both scenarios, i.e.: when using the complete
and the reduced set of financial ratios.
Particularly superior performance accomplished by random forests when the reduced
set of explanatory variables are considered, as 90% of non-fraudulent cases are
correctly classified, as well as 83.8% of fraudulent cases.
TABLE 6.9: Classification Accuracy Industry Specific
SIC 8: Public Administration
Sample size: 72
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Complete set of financial ratios K = 13
LDA 0.591 0.400 0.750 0.600 0.548 0.667 0.575
QDA 0.864 1.000 0.750 1.000 0.866 0.857 0.875
LR 0.727 0.600 0.833 0.714 0.707 0.769 0.717
AB 0.818 0.900 0.750 0.900 0.822 0.818 0.825
DT 0.818 0.900 0.750 0.900 0.822 0.818 0.825
BT 0.773 0.800 0.750 0.818 0.775 0.783 0.775
RF 0.818 0.900 0.750 0.900 0.822 0.818 0.825
Reduced set of financial ratios k = 8
LDA 0.636 0.400 0.833 0.625 0.577 0.714 0.617
QDA 0.818 0.900 0.750 0.900 0.822 0.818 0.825
LR 0.727 0.600 0.833 0.714 0.707 0.769 0.717
AB 0.727 0.700 0.750 0.750 0.725 0.750 0.725
DT 0.773 0.700 0.833 0.769 0.764 0.800 0.767
BT 0.773 0.700 0.833 0.769 0.764 0.800 0.767
RF 0.864 0.900 0.833 0.909 0.866 0.870 0.867
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FIGURE 6.8: Models Classification Accuracy
Industry: Public Administration
6.4 Summary
Results obtained in Chapter 6, suggest that all machine learning methods proposed
in this study provide superior predictive power compared to a naive strategy of
classifying all firms as one class, either fraud or non-fraud. It is clear that explanatory
variables used in developing a particular fraud detection model may differ from one
industry to another, and therefore a domain-specific analysis is much more adequate
when detecting accounting fraud offences.
It is worth mentioning as well, that in almost all industries, using the reduced
set of financial ratios leads to similar results compared to the ones achieved using
the complete set, in some cases even better performance is accomplished, which is
very interesting since it supports the usefulness of employing less but significant
information when detecting accounting fraud offences.
In the next chapter, decision rules obtained from decision tree models will be
identified and further explained in order to responsibly assist the task of examination
of financial statement reports. The proposed methodology is intended to support
regulatory efforts to accurately detect, not only fraudulent corporations, but also
financial accounts that are more likely to be manipulated.
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Financial Indicators of
Accounting Fraud
In this Chapter, practical suggestions for effective examination of accounting
information are given to further detect accounting fraud offences. Control strategies
can be easily established taking into account different fraudulent tricks that are most
commonly used when committing accounting fraud. What it is aimed in this case is to
assist the oversight task related to accounting fraud offences using analytical results,
to ultimately attempt to reduce the attractiveness of criminal opportunities within the
corporate context.
Several statistical models have been implemented to better discriminate between
fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms within different industry domains. Results
from Chapter 6 support good performance of decision trees as a fraud-risk
assessment tool. As such, rules obtained from these models can be described to
expose industry-specific fraudulent behaviour, to be used later as warning signs of
accounting fraud offences. Thereby, tree-based models will be interpreted in what
follows to exhibit domain-specific financial indicators of accounting fraud.
It is worth mentioning that no relevant patterns have been found within the
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing industry probably due to the small amount of
available data, and therefore the inability of finding significant red flags in this
domain.
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7.1 Mining and Construction
As depicted in Figure 7.1, two main red-flags can be used to detect fraudulent
companies belonging to the mining and construction industry that are specifically
associated with the items of inventory and accounts receivable.
• The first indicator of accounting fraud is IVTA. The evidence suggests that it
is more likely to be in presence of fraud when this ratio is bigger than 0.0118,
which indicates that fraudulent firms tend to exaggerate inventory levels in this
particular industry. Hence, fraud alarms should be activated when inventories
represent more than 1.2% of total assets in mining and construction firms.
• The second indicator than can be used to expose falsified reports is RVSA.
As such, when inventory levels compared to assets (IVTA) are within the
non-fraudulent range (i.e.: lower than 0.0118), then auditors should check if
RVSA levels are higher that 0.234. Therefore, the greater the probability of
accounting fraud when figures of receivables represent more than 23.4% of total
sales.
FIGURE 7.1: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Mining and Construction
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        52      50.0
     Fraud                52      50.0
    Total                 104     100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       38      73.1
     Fraud               14      26.9
    Total                  52     50.0* 
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       14       26.9
     Fraud               38       73.1
    Total                  52       50.0* 
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       30      90.9
     Fraud                 3        9.1
    Total                  33      31.7* 
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        8        42.1
     Fraud               11       57.9
    Total                 19       18.3* 
IVTA
RVSA
<=0.0118 >0.0118
<=0.234 >0.234
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7.2 Manufacturing
Figure 7.2 illustrates a fairly more complex scheme commonly perpetrated by
fraudulent firms within the manufacturing industry, as the resulting tree contains
more branching.
Falsifying reports in this case, usually involves the manipulation of three financial
items, that is, retained earnings, current assets and total liabilities. Moreover, decision
tree results indicate that auditors should be more skeptical if RETA is higher that
-0.292, CATA lower than 0.347 and TLTE higher than 1.132, since these three red-flags
together are often seen when fraud is being committed in manufacturing firms.
In other words, high probability of accounting fraud will be present when:
• accounts receivables represent more than 39.2% of total assets;
• the proportion of current assets in relation to total assets is lower than 0.347; and
• total liabilities are 13.2% or higher than shareholders’ equity.
7.3 Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and
Sanitary Service
It can be seen from Figure 7.3 that the two most significant predictors of accounting
fraud committed in this industry are IVSA and PYCOGS. As such, fraudulent
reporting is more likely to be occurring as a result of misstatement of inventory levels
and/or accounts payable figures.
As for the case of inventory manipulation, the warning sign is triggered when IVSA is
lower or equal than zero. And as explained in Chapter 3.4.4, figures of inventory and
total sales cannot be negative due to the lack of economic meaning. Then, the only
possibility in this case is that inventories are zero. Consequently, auditors should be
cautious when null inventories are part of financial statements as it may be a sign of
accounting fraud.
On the other hand, if inventory levels are not null, then fraud alarm should be
activated when accounts payable represent 28.2% of cost of good sold, as it may be
indicating fraudulent activities.
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FIGURE 7.2: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Manufacturing
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      609      50.0
     Fraud              609      50.0
    Total              1,218    100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       218     59.7
     Fraud               147     40.3
    Total                  365     30.0* 
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       391     45.8
     Fraud               462     54.2
    Total                  853     70.0* 
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        80      41.7
     Fraud               112     58.3
    Total                  192     15.8* 
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      311      47.1
     Fraud              350      52.9
    Total                 661      54.2* 
RETA
CATA
<=-0.292 >-0.292
<=0.347 >0.347
Node 5
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       27      47.4
     Fraud               30      52.6
    Total                  57       4.7* 
Node 6
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       53       39.3
     Fraud               82       60.7
    Total                135       11.1* 
TLTE
<=1.132 >1.132
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FIGURE 7.3: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary
Service
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      106     50.0
     Fraud              106     50.0
    Total                 212    100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       24      38.1
     Fraud               39      61.9
    Total                  63      29.7* 
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       82       55.0
     Fraud               67       45.0
    Total                 149      70.3* 
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       75       60.0
     Fraud               50       40.0
    Total                 125      59.0* 
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        7        29.2
     Fraud              17        70.8
    Total                 24       11.3* 
IVSA
PYCOGS
<=0 >0
<=0.282 >0.282
7.4 Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade
Results suggest that fraudulent trading companies manipulate mainly two financial
items simultaneously, that is, retained earnings and inventories. Two clear patterns
can be identified when accounting fraud is being committed, as shown in Figure 7.4.
• Financial ratio RETA between 0 and 0.186, as well as IVSA higher than 0.189.
That is, moderate positive values of retained earnings and large values of
inventory happening together represents a clear sign of falsified reports.
• Financial ratio RETA higher than 0.186 and at the same time, IVSA higher
than 0.335 That is, exaggerated valuation of earnings compared to assets and
inventory compared to sales are considered in this industry as irregular, hence
more attention should be paid when facing this situation.
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7.5 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
It has been shown that the most significant predictors of accounting fraud committed
in the finance industry are PYCOGS, LTDTA and TLTE. As seen in Figure 7.3,
fraudulent reporting is more likely to be occurring as a result of manipulation of
accounts payable and debt-specific figures.
On the one hand, if accounts payable are lower or equal to zero together with
long-term debt higher than zero then more attention must be paid as it may be a
sign of accounting fraud.
On the other hand, if accounts payable to cost of good sold are higher than 22.815 and,
simultaneously, total liabilities are 19.05 times more than shareholders’ equity, then
warning alarm should be activated as irregular patterns are occurring that suggest
fraudulent activities.
7.6 Services
As depicted in Figure 7.6, a fairly straightforward trick is usually performed by
fraudulent companies in the industry of service, that is understating of sales figure
together with the artificial exaggeration of inventory. More scrutiny should be
made when total sales represent less than 25.6% of total assets, as well as when the
proportion of inventory in terms of cost of good sold is higher than 0.032, as they may
be indicating that accounting fraud is being conducted.
7.7 Public Administration
Accounting fraud in the industry of public administration is highly related to large
values of inventory compared to sales, as it can be seen in Figure 7.7. Furthermore,
special attention should be paid when evidencing inventories representing 6.3% or
more of total sales, as this is a clear sign of manipulated financial reports.
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FIGURE 7.6: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Services
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      375       50.0
     Fraud              375       50.0
    Total                 750     100.0*
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       213     40.7
     Fraud               311     59.3
    Total                  524     69.9*
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       110     72.9
     Fraud                 41     27.1
    Total                  151     20.1* 
SATA
(0.256, 1.364] >1.364
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       48      81.4
     Fraud               11      18.6
    Total                  59       7.9*
Node 5
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud         4       25.0
     Fraud               12       75.0
    Total                  16        2.1* 
IVCOGS
<=0.032 >0.032
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       52      69.3
     Fraud               23      30.7
    Total                 75       10.0*
<=0.256
FIGURE 7.7: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Public Administration
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        36      50.0
     Fraud                36      50.0
    Total                   72    100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       25      86.2
     Fraud                 4      13.8
    Total                 29       40.3*
Node 2
   Category             n        %
     Non-Fraud       11      25.6
     Fraud               33      74.4
    Total                  43      59.7* 
IVSA
<=0.063 >0.063
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Conclusions, Limitations and
Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
This study aims to identify signs of accounting fraud occurrence to be used to,
first, identify companies that are more likely to be manipulating financial statement
reports, and second, assist the task of examination within the riskier firms by
evaluating relevant financial red-flags, as to efficiently recognise irregular accounting
malpractices.
To achieve this, a thorough forensic data analytic approach is proposed that includes
all pertinent steps of a data-driven methodology. First, data collection and preparation
is required to present pertinent information related to fraud offences and financial
statements. Then, an in-depth financial ratio analysis is performed in order to
analyse the collected data and to preserve only meaningful variables, selection
that will be validated later using a more sophisticated technique that extends the
well-known approach of complete subset regression. Finally, statistical modelling
of fraudulent and non-fraudulent instances is performed by implementing several
machine learning methods, followed by the extraction of distinctive fraud-risk
indicators related to each economic sector.
This study contributes in the improvement of accounting fraud detection in
several ways, including the collection of a comprehensive sample of fraud and
non-fraud firms concerning all financial industries, an extensive analysis of financial
information and significant differences between genuine and fraudulent reporting,
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selection of relevant predictors of accounting fraud, contingent analytical modelling
for better differentiate between non-fraud and fraud cases, and identification of
industry-specific indicators of falsified records.
There is a clear enhancement in the understanding of the fraud phenomenon by the
implementation of financial ratio analysis, mainly due to the interesting exposure of
distinctive characteristics of falsified reporting and the selection of meaningful ratios
as predictors of accounting fraud, later validated using a combination of logistic
regression models. Interestingly, using only significant explanatory variables leads
to similar results obtained when no selection is performed. Furthermore, better
performance is accomplished in some cases, which strongly supports the usefulness of
employing less but significant information when detecting accounting fraud offences.
The results of the current research suggest there is a great potential in detecting
falsified accounting records through statistical modelling and analysis of publicly
available accounting information. It has been shown good performance of basic
models used as benchmark - Discriminant Analysis and Logistic Regression-, and
better performance of more advanced methods such as AdaBoost, Decision Trees,
Boosted Trees and Random Forests. Results support the usefulness of machine
learning models as they appropriately meet the criteria of accuracy, interpretability
and cost-efficiency required for a successful detection methodology.
The proposed methodology can be easily used by public auditors and regulatory
agencies in order to assess the likelihood of accounting fraud, and also to be
adopted in combination with the experience and instinct of experts to lead to better
examination of accounting reports.
In addition, the proposed methodological framework could be of assistance to many
other interested parties, such as investors, creditors, financial and economic analysts,
the stock exchange, law firms and to the banking system, amongst others.
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8.2 Limitations
The collected sample of accounting fraud offences is considered to be only a fragment
of the population of companies issuing fraudulent financial statement, as there is no
guarantee that non-fraudulent firms are in fact legitimate observations until proven
otherwise. Also, non-public companies are excluded from this study as the SEC only
has jurisdiction over publicly traded companies.
It is worth noting that accounting fraud is very versatile, and as such, will always
evolve in terms of deceptive tricks. Managers will adapt their fraudulent schemes
in order to successfully commit fraud, hence results obtained in this study are
exclusively consequence of the investigation of the collected data and different
conclusions may be reach when considering an alternative source of information.
Lastly, models performances are not ideal in some scenarios mainly due to sample
size, omitted variables and/or implemented techniques. Better accuracy would
be likely achieved if different predictors were included in the analysis, such as
stock information, corporate governance data, management quality, macro-economic
information, competitors? financial data and more.
8.3 Future Work
It is strongly suggested the inclusion of other relevant information to help better
understanding the accounting fraud phenomenon, which may consist of qualitative
variables, including corporate governance information and inside trading data, as
well as time-evolving features and industry-trending benchmarks. It would not be
surprising to discover interesting temporal patterns of stock prices or asset returns
when dealing with fraudulent corporations, or find an extraordinary economic
performance of dishonest companies compared to the industry average.
Further work can be done for classification threshold selection. When modelling
the accounting fraud phenomenon, it was mentioned that a specific classification
threshold was considered to determine fraud and non-fraud categories in several
machine learning techniques. Evaluation of different thresholds would be of much
interest as it may improve classification accuracy in a cost-sensitive environment such
as the one at issue.
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In addition, different methodologies are suggested to tackle the imbalance class
challenge. The method adopted in the present study was based on random
under-sampling, but other techniques may improve this part of the process,
such as random over-sampling, bootstrap models, cost modifying methods and
algorithm-level approaches, to name a few.
More advanced techniques are also recommended specifically when dealing with
accounting fraud affairs, including missing value treatment, sample selection and
imbalanced database issues, outlier detection and treatment, and variable selection.
Additionally, it would be very interesting to implement alternative and more
advanced machine learning methods, such as support vector machines, neural
networks and Bayesian models, as they may be helpful to correctly identify fraudulent
firms.
In addition, it is suggested to replicate the proposed methodology in specific economic
domains, such as the pharmaceutical industry, health care industry and financial
industry, amongst others. The more specialised the industry, the more interesting
patterns are likely to be found.
Finally, more extensive analyses can be performed to tackle the broader topic of
white-collar and corporate crimes, such as social network techniques that can be
used to uncover sophisticated fraudulent networks between business affiliates and
subsidiaries, as well as connection with other companies or even further associations
with political bodies and governmental servants.
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